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Abstract
 During the twentieth century, as Canadian voters began to associate the brand of their 
major political parties with the characteristics of their leaders, the Liberal Party of Canada’s 
leadership races evolved into events of national importance. This study examines this 
transformation through the 1948, 1958 and 1968 leadership conventions. It incorporates 
perspectives from inside the Liberal Party as well as the Canadian media’s portrayals of the 
conventions. This thesis explores the alternating pattern of anglophone and francophone Party 
leaders, the complications associated with the predictability of the outcome, the evolution of 
convention tactics to recruit delegate support, Party (dis)unity throughout the contests, and the 
political science theories that deconstruct the conventions and predict outcomes. It also details 
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 The Liberal Party of Canada is the oldest political party in the country. The Party’s 
origins stem from loose political factions in Upper and Lower Canada. The Clear Grits in Upper 
Canada had occasionally united with Parti rouge of Lower Canada in the legislature of the 
United Province of Canada. The perennial conflict between English and French factions made 
common ground difficult to find. Nevertheless, a united Liberal Party was created in 1861, 
combining the two groups in a formal alliance. The Party’s struggles in trying to manage English 
and French interests remained. In the quarter century after Confederation, the Liberal Party 
served as the official opposition to John A. Macdonald’s Conservative Party of Canada, apart 
from a brief Liberal interlude during Alexander Mackenzie’s tenure as prime minister from 
1874-78.
 In 1887 the charismatic, Catholic, French Canadian Wilfrid Laurier was appointed leader 
of the Liberal Party and transformed it into a credible alternative option to Macdonald’s 
Conservatives. Laurier capitalized on the Conservatives’ alienation of Quebec and promoted 
trade reciprocity with the United States, which allowed the Liberals to gain a foothold in the 
Prairies. In 1896, he became Canada’s first francophone prime minister in a watershed election. 
Laurier held Canada’s highest office until 1911, balancing the competing, and sometimes 
aggressive, interests of English- and French-speaking Canada. Ultimately Laurier’s Liberals 
were defeated in 1911 by an “unholy alliance” of French Canadian nationalists and Borden 
Conservatives who divided the country over the naval debate and reciprocity with the United 
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States to defeat the Liberals. Laurier continued to lead the party from the Opposition benches 
through the First World War, including the 1917 election when many of his English-speaking 
caucus members left the Liberals to run under the Union banner to invoke conscription for 
overseas service. 
 Laurier died in 1919 and a young William Lyon Mackenzie King was elected his 
successor at a Liberal Leadership Convention on the fifth ballot over William S. Fielding. King 
followed Laurier’s 32 years as Liberal Party leader with 29 of his own, cementing a political 
legacy that no Liberal or Conservative would match. King built the Liberal Party’s strength in 
Quebec, continually winning the province in general elections. King’s nearly three decades as 
Liberal leader included twenty-two years as prime minister, making him the longest serving 
leader in Commonwealth history.1 The Liberal Party had blossomed into “the government 
party,”2 a seemingly unbeatable force in Canadian politics. 
King’s retirement in 1948 initiated a new chapter in the history of the Liberal Party. After 
almost six decades with Laurier and King as leader, the Liberals chose three leaders in the next 
twenty years. The Party’s identity, and the unofficial factions that operated within it, changed as 
new faces and ideas emerged through three leadership campaigns. Before Louis St-Laurent, 
Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau stood in front of the national electorate as the face of the 
Liberal brand, they first had to win over their peers: card-carrying Liberals. This study addresses 
how they came to assume the leadership of the Liberal Party, and how these leadership selection 
processes reflected the evolution of party culture after the Second World War.
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1 King served as Prime Minister from 29 December 1921 until 28 June 1926, 25 September 1926 until 6 August 
1930, and 23 October 1935 until 14 November 1948.
2 The phrase “the government party” was coined by Reginald Whitaker in The Government Party: Organizing and 
Financing the Liberal Party of Canada 1930-58, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
 This study examines National Liberal Leadership Conventions and Canadian media 
observations thereof. Primary source materials including memoirs, private papers, campaign 
materials, Liberal Party documents, newspapers, magazines, and television broadcasts shed light 
on what transpired. Memoirs corroborate or refute media reports, providing personal 
recollections about colleagues’ personal motivations and the leadership campaigns themselves. 
Archival materials from the personal papers of Liberal politicians and the Liberal Party of 
Canada include leadership campaign analyses, convention strategy, and both official and private 
correspondence. I have analyzed media coverage in the week leading up to and following the 
1948, 1958 and 1968 conventions, including newspapers from every Canadian province and 
popular magazines.
 Shifts among competing factions within the Liberal Party have become readily apparent 
in recent years through the exploits of Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Stéphane Dion, Michael 
Ignatieff and Bob Rae. This thesis indicates that the Party’s internecine squabbling over 
leadership is not new, but dates back to 1968. The National Liberal Leadership Conventions in 
1948 and 1958 did not threaten the unity of the Liberal Party organization, and these leadership 
races nurtured the needs of the Liberal Party over the candidates themselves. Part and parcel with 
the Progressive Conservatives’ unsuccessful opposition, the Liberals of 1948 and 1958 were 
developing a brand that was trusted by Canadians and an organization where politicians of 
various ideological bents worked together to achieve party goals. By 1968 the culture had 
changed. The race to replace Pearson was fought by a new generation of Liberals who lacked 
organizational experience and placed their personal aspirations ahead of party interests.  This 
represented a fundamental transformation in party culture.
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 Alternance -- the theory that the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada must alternate 
between an Anglophone and Francophone -- is a fundamental component of Liberal Party 
history. The tradition began with Laurier and King and has persisted ever since. This study 
examines the impact of alternance at the Party’s leadership conventions and explains how it 
emerged as unofficial doctrine of Liberal leadership. By 1968 alternance was firmly embraced by 
Liberals as criteria for Liberal leadership races. The long pattern of alternating that had occurred 
up until then, combined with the delicate political relationship between Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, brought this result.
  Another symptom of culture change within the Liberal Party was weakening control 
exerted by the outgoing leader. Political scientist Reginald Whitaker asserts that “one of King’s 
greatest concerns in his last few years was what he believed to be the declining political fortunes 
of the Liberal party and the failure of the party to maintain proper organization following the 
1945 election victory.”3 Under the weight of these concerns Mackenzie King decided to retire 
from Canadian political life in 1948. King believed Louis St Laurent was the Liberal Party’s best 
hope for a revival in the postwar period, and the outgoing leader orchestrated a series of major 
endorsements from high-profile Liberals to hand St Laurent the reins with an overwhelming 
majority of support. These endorsements were not aimed at the critical voice of Charles Power, 
but to counteract the leadership campaign of Jimmy Gardiner who King considered the real 
threat to St Laurent. This maneuver was not just about picking a successor. King’s efforts at the 
1948 Convention were designed to ensure he left a well-organized Liberal Party in the trusted 
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3 Whitaker, The Government Party, 168.
hands of St Laurent. King succeeded, and St Laurent was elected with strong cabinet, caucus and 
delegate support. 
 At the 1958 Convention, St Laurent remained neutral when the Party faithful chose his 
successor. The main contenders for his position, Lester Pearson and Paul Martin, did not allow 
the contest to distract from their duties as critics, and their race reflected their loyalty to both 
leader and Party. The circumstances were profoundly different ten years later. Although Pearson 
remained officially neutral, it was public knowledge that the outgoing leader favoured Pierre 
Trudeau. The various contenders put the leadership race ahead of broader Party interests and 
brought the government within a motion away from a non-confidence defeat in the House of 
Commons in March 1968. Pearson’s weak grasp on the Party machine was a stark contrast to 
King’s power, influence and control twenty years earlier. The culture of the Party and the 
politicians who led it had changed, and this study highlights the significant transformation that 
occurred over the twenty year period.
Leadership Convention Theory
 Leadership conventions emerged as the standard practice by which Canadian political 
parties selected a leader in the twentieth century. The convention process was first introduced by 
the Liberal Party in 1919 and adopted by the Conservative Party in 1927. Political scientist John 
Courtney describes how “Conventions with several hundred delegates drawn together from 
across the Dominion were regarded as being both more ‘representative’ of the party as a whole 
than the parliamentary caucus and more ‘democratic’ as a means for selecting party leaders in 
5
1919 and 1928.”4  These conventions also helped political parties overcome regional imbalance 
and weaknesses in Parliament.5 Over time they became a fundamental component of Canadian 
politics,6 passing control over leader selection from the parliamentary group to the grassroots 
party members.7 Courtney adds that the significant growth in delegates for leadership 
conventions changed party organization, expanding the role of the extra-parliamentary 
members.8
 Courtney argues that leadership conventions are built on representational and democratic 
principles: the more delegates at conventions, the more democratic and legitimate the process 
becomes.9 J. Lele, G.C. Perlin and Hugh Thorburn counter this assertion, arguing that convention 
delegates are unrepresentative of Canada’s population. Using the 1967 PC convention, 1968 
Liberal convention and 1971 New Democratic Party convention as examples, they contend that 
the leadership conventions “were representative of the more privileged groups in Canadian 
society. They resembled neither the mass of Canadian society nor the respective party’s 
supporters in the 1968 general election.”10  Courtney and Lele, Perlin, and Thorburn are correct. 
6
4 John C. Courtney, The selection of national party leaders in Canada, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1973), 78.
5 John C. Courtney, “The Morning After: Delegate Accountability,” Parliamentary Government 4, no. 2 (1983): 8; 
John C. Courtney, “Leadership Conventions and the Development of the National Political Community in Canada,” 
in National Politics and Community in Canada, eds. Kenneth R. Carty and W. Peter Ward (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1986), 94.
6 Courtney, The selection of national party leaders in Canada, 82.
7 John W. Lederle, “National Party Conventions: Canada Shows the Way,” Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 
25 (September 1944): 119.
8 Courtney, The selection of national party leaders in Canada, 78-79; Courtney, “The Morning After: Delegate 
Accountability,” 8.
9 John C. Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?: Choosing National Party Leaders in Canada, (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 129.
10 J. Lele, G.C. Perlin, and H.G. Thorburn, “The National Party Convention,” in Party Politics in Canada, ed. Hugh 
G. Thorburn, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985), 89.
Lele, Perlin, and Thorburn’s argument of a specific Convention delegate being unrepresentative 
of the general Party members and the general Canadian population are accurate. Those 
observations, however, do not render political leadership conventions as unrepresentative and 
undemocratic. Could that same argument be applied to the Canadian House of Commons? 
Courtney’s position is far more conducive to the realities of Canada’s political system.
 Canadian leadership conventions can be broken down into early and modern periods. The 
early period consisted of conventions from 1919 to 1958. Courtney and Heather MacIvor 
characterize conventions during this era as small in size and dominated by the parliamentary 
caucus of the party.11 The conventions from 1967 to 1990 were substantively different. MacIvor 
says the parliamentary wings of the parties had far less influence and the competitiveness of the 
races intensified in the election of delegates across the country and at the convention itself. This 
produced a greater degree of competition and unpredictability.12 Courtney says that the races 
became more sophisticated. “To acquire the necessary professional help, to win candidate 
selection races, and to organize national campaigns, serious leadership contenders needed to 
raise and to spend vastly larger amounts of money than had ever before.”13 Accordingly, after 
1967, conventions grew to have more delegates, candidates, television coverage, public 
involvement and money.14
 Donald V. Smiley says that the Canadian party convention has two fundamental rules: 
“(a) voting is by secret individual ballot; (b) successive ballots are held at short intervals until 
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11 Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?, 12; Heather MacIvor, “The Leadership Convention: An Institution Under 
Stress,” in Leaders and leadership in Canada, eds. Maureen Maneuso, Richard G. Price and Ronald Wagenberg, 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.
12 MacIvor, “The Leadership Convention: An Institution Under Stress,” 17.
13 Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?, 30.
14 Ibid.
one candidate has a majority of all votes cast.”15 These two principles ensure that leadership 
selection reinforces the importance of relations between candidates and delegates, between 
delegates and provincial and other party leaders, and between candidates themselves.16 Smiley 
further dissects this process in his explanation of aspiring leaders’ strategies. He argues that a 
candidate’s first aim is to encourage individual delegates to support him and declare their support 
to influence uncommitted delegates.17 Second, he or she seeks to secure the tolerance of 
delegates pledged to other contenders to win in a multiple ballot convention. He explains the 
multi-ballot scenario:
If delegate X is committed openly to candidate Y, his support may be needed on the 
second ballot--or even more crucially, on the fifth--by candidates Y2, Y3, and Y4, when 
Y1 has been eliminated from the contest, either by the voting rules or his own voluntary 
withdrawal. Thus every delegate is in a sense “up for grabs” by every serious contender.18
The third relationship that Smiley says is necessary to win a leadership convention is the support 
of other leadership candidates. This process is difficult, however, as convention mythology 
favours “no deals” and candidates caught making them publicly elicit unfavourable publicity.19
 Courtney’s contentions about the balloting process are purely theoretical. As the number 
of candidates seeking the leadership increases, so does the number of ballots to select the winner. 
Furthermore, Courtney says that it reasonable to anticipate that as the number of ballots increase, 
so does the opportunity for creating two competing coalitions.20 A convention coalition is a 
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15 Donald V. Smiley, “The National Party Leadership Convention in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis,” in Apex of 
Power: the prime minister and political leadership in Canada, ed. Thomas A. Hockin, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall 





20 Courtney, Do Conventions Matter?, 213.
“discrete, loosely knit aggregate of individual delegates temporarily united through their 
common electoral support of a candidate.”21 Courtney’s coalition theory “describes a collection 
of individual delegates who with possibly different preferred outcomes at the beginning of the 
voting nonetheless for at least one ballot support the same candidate in an attempt either to 
maximize what they want out of the election or to minimize what they do not want.”22  The 
theory of conflict of interest explains why certain coalitions stand a greater chance of being 
formed than others. All candidates and delegates differ from one another and no two are strictly 
alike. It is equally true, Courtney asserts, that some candidates and delegates have more in 
common with one another than with other candidates and delegates. Consequently, members who 
vote together do so because they share common attitudes and interests. Courtney theorizes that 
“potential coalitions of individuals with compatible goals and preferences based on private 
benefits and ideological, strategic, and personal considerations are more likely to form and to last 
than other potential coalitions with greater conflict of interest among their members.”23
 Although there is no sure way to predict coalition winners, Courtney’s theory asserts that 
“the candidate who gains the largest share of the votes from the first to the second ballot will 
become the eventual winner.”24 Seven of the eight conventions in Canadian federal politics that 
have required three or more ballots confirm this pattern. Courtney’s alternative hypothesis, that 






thirteen conventions lasting two or more ballots.25 These theoretical perspectives support the 
historical evidence and analysis of the 1948, 1958 and 1968 Liberal Leadership Conventions.
 Much of the theory concerning Canadian leadership conventions concerns a contest with 
multiple contenders and multiple ballots. Consequently the theories proposed by Courtney, 
MacIvor, and Smiley resonate with only the 1968 Liberal Leadership Convention. Courtney’s 
assertion that as the number of candidates increases, so too will the number of ballots, holds true, 
as it does with the 1948 and 1958 Conventions with three candidates in each contest resulted in a 
first ballot decision. Furthermore, Courtney’s point stands that as the number of ballots increases 
so does the number of opportunities to form competing coalitions. In 1968 Paul Hellyer, Robert 
Winters and John Turner had multiple opportunities to create a coalition to defeat Trudeau but 
refused to do so. As Smiley explained, the relationship between Trudeau and his opponents that 
ultimately supported, or opposed him, also became an important factor. When Sharp, Greene, 
and MacEachen moved to support Trudeau, their delegates had an important influence on the 
outcome. If a strong relationship had existed between Turner, Hellyer, and Winters, a coalition to 
defeat Trudeau might have succeeded. Finally, Courtney’s point that the winner on the first ballot 
ultimately wins the convention is proven in the case of Trudeau.26
 The evidence from these three case studies disproves other proposed leadership 
convention theory. The 1968 convention, for example, did not support Courtney’s assertion that 
the candidate who gains the largest percentage of vote increase on the second ballot ultimately 
wins the convention. Winters 31 per cent increase compared to Trudeau’s 26, Hellyer’s 24, and 
10
25 Ibid, 231-232.
26 It should be noted that Dalton McGuinty’s victory in 1996 and Stephane Dion’s victory in 2006 both break with 
Courtney’s model.
Turner’s 12 did not yield a victory in the end. Had Winters been able to court Turner to his side, 
the convention might have produced a different party leader.
  This study does not pin point the Liberal Party’s leadership problems in 2012 on the 
events that took place at the 1968 Convention. Instead this research identifies some of the 
cultural transformations that occurred in the Liberal Party over the 30 year period of 1948 to 
1968. The way Liberal Party leadership was viewed in 1968 is a primary outcome of this study.
  I have been an actively involved in the Liberal Party of Canada and the Ontario Liberal 
Party since 2004. My involvement includes working on many election campaigns, in 
constituency offices, and both ministers’ offices and Caucus Services at Queen’s Park. 
Nonetheless, my active role in politics does not preclude me from being firm in my analysis and 
sincere in my conclusions. My roles as a Liberal and historian have led me to set party unity as a 
primary criteria to measure success. After all, the effectiveness of a political party during 
elections and in government depends on its ability to run an efficient and strong organization.
 As the party transitioned from the long-tenured political leaderships of Laurier and King 
to the short-tenured leaderships of St Laurent and Pearson, the organizational culture of the 
Liberal Party changed. After the resignation of Pearson, the personal brands of Trudeau, Hellyer, 
Winters, Turner and Martin clashed in a leadership contest that split the party.  Their campaigns 
were divisive and began years of difficult leadership questions within the party that persist today.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE GENTLEMEN’S GAME: WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE KING AND THE 1948 
NATIONAL LIBERAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION
When we remember what has happened in the last half century, in the twelve 
general elections that have occurred, I think we are entitled to feel that our policies 
are an expression of the true and firm aspirations and ideals of the Canadian 
people. We have, in the results of those elections, evidence that the Liberal Party  is 
a truly Canadian party.
     Louis St. Laurent, Coliseum, Ottawa, 7 August1948.
 On 7 August 1948, Louis St Laurent spoke to the delegates of the National Liberal 
Leadership Convention at the Coliseum in Ottawa about the foundations of their party.  “We 
must not forget that we who are here today represent the vast majority of the Canadian people,” 
he proclaimed. “We represent the Liberal Party and the Liberal Party has at almost all times 
represented the majority of the Canadian people.”27 St Laurent and his colleagues believed that 
the party had become the defining force in the development of Canada and in the lives of 
Canadians. Liberals from the top of the organization down to its grassroots members shared the 
idea, and ideal, of a Liberal Canada. 
 The Liberal Party was entering a new age in 1948.  Liberal leader and Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, who had become a fixture in both government and the Party, 
declared that he would retire. The race for succession as leader and prime minister was between 
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27 St. Laurent, “1948 National Liberal Convention Speech,” Delegates address, National Liberal Convention, 
Coliseum, Ottawa Ontario, August 7 1948.
three men: Louis St Laurent, 66; 28 Jimmy Gardiner, 65; 29 and Charles Power, 60.30 In the end, St 
Laurent (supported by the outgoing prime minister) won on the first ballot with 848 votes over 
Gardiner’s 323 and Power’s 56.31
 The historiography of the 1948 National Liberal Leadership Convention is sparse. The 
most thorough discussion is in Reginald Whitaker’s The Government Party: Organizing and 
Financing the Liberal Party of Canada 1930-1958, but biographies of St. Laurent, Gardiner, 
C.D. Howe, and Brooke Claxton also provide important insights into what transpired. “Certainly, 
throughout his long career as party leader King never gave the slightest indication that he 
harboured any belief in intra-party democracy,” Whitaker argues, “especially when the definition 
of party was extended beyond the cabinet and the parliamentary caucus.”32 According to this 
political scientist, the veteran Prime Minister was firmly opposed to national conventions, 
despite having been chosen as leader at one in 1919.33 King’s dislike for these gatherings verified 
his desire to maintain a firm grasp on the affairs of the Liberal Party and government policy.34 
David Bercuson in his biography of Brooke Claxton, and Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and 
John English in their book Canada Since 1945, echo this view.35 Although King was in the 
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28 Member of Parliament for Quebec-East and Minister of External Affairs
29 Member of Parliament for Melville and Minister of Agriculture
30 Member of Parliament for Quebec South and former Cabinet Minister during the Second World War
31 James Gordon Fogo, “Leadership Results,” Announcement, National Liberal Convention, Coliseum, Ottawa 
Ontario, August 7 1948.
32 Whitaker, The Government Party, 171.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 David J. Bercuson, True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1993), 199; Robert Bothwell, Drummond Ian, English John, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and 
Provincialism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 77.
twilight of his political career, his control remained unshaken throughout the August 1948 
Convention. Whitaker points out that King wanted to go over all resolutions from the resolution 
subcommittee to ensure the Liberal Party remained consistent with the government’s policies.36 
Furthermore, Whitaker ascertains that when Jimmy Gardiner began to discuss his own platform 
for government policy, King decided to deliberately assist St Laurent in his leadership bid.37 
Historiographical consensus holds that Mackenzie King approached the 1948 National Liberal 
Leadership Convention with the same steady hand that he used to govern the country. The 
veteran Prime Minister never relinquished control over the Liberal Party’s political fortunes, and 
he would ensure that his final swan song would end in perfect tune. This chapter challenges 
Whitaker’s view that King’s motive was to ensure a St Laurent victory, arguing that King’s 
primary motive was to ensure the unity of the Liberal Party through a French Canadian 
successor. St Laurent was the choice of King and senior members of caucus. 
 When the party’s cautious, perennial leader finally decided to step aside in 1948, the 
younger members of the Liberal caucus, such as Brooke Claxton and Douglas Abbott, were 
relieved.38 Nevertheless, King’s retirement brought uncertainties, and Claxton expressed 
concerns to King that the succession was unsettling Liberals across the country.39 The 1948 
National Liberal Leadership Convention would be a milestone in Liberal Party politics: a new 
hand would steer the organization that Laurier and King built over more than a half century. 
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36 Whitaker, The Government Party, 174.
37 Ibid.
38 Patrick H. Brennan, Reporting the Nation’s Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 
1935-1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 146.
39 Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, 210.
 The 1948 National Liberal Leadership Convention offered the prospect of party 
rejuvenation at a time of tremendous political uncertainty. Factions tested party unity as they 
competed for voice, control, and personal interest. Younger members of the Liberal Party 
believed in a fresh direction. Nevertheless, Liberals left the Convention stronger than when they 
arrived. The historiography observes that delegates felt frustration following the convention, but 
a fresh appraisal of the evidence suggests the opposite view: that the leadership selection process 
left Liberals reassured that the Party’s political future was in steady, capable hands. Despite all 
the political maneuvering, Liberals wanted St Laurent. 
 This chapter explores several themes. First it considers the impact of Jeanne St Laurent, 
the wife of Louis St Laurent, on the leadership race. The Canadian media was fascinated with the 
photogenic Mrs. St Laurent, over her sacrifice for the good of the country, and the allure of 
finally having a First Lady. Second, the chapter discusses the Young Liberals’ frustrations at the 
Convention. Youth delegates arrived in Ottawa with high expectations, but left disappointed - a 
sentiment publicized in the Canadian media. This chapter also examines the leadership candidacy 
of Paul Martin. It considers Martin’s groundswell of support at the grassroots level, and the 
factors affecting his decision to withdraw from the leadership race. Finally, Mackenzie King’s 
intervention in the race is considered in detail, emphasizing how the outgoing prime minister’s 
typical obfuscation helped blur the lines between opposing factions and maintain Party unity. 
A Grand Convention: Procedures, Rules and Format 
15
 Mackenzie King informed the National Liberal Federation in January 1948 that he 
intended to resign and he called for a leadership convention to select his successor.40 On 19 
March 1948 the Executive Committee of the Liberal Party issued The Call for a National 
Convention of the Liberal Party: “(1) to consider the platform of the Liberal Party of Canada; (2) 
to consider the question of Party organization; (3) to consider the question of Party leadership.”41 
In August 1948, Liberals from across Canada descended upon Ottawa, representing all 255 
electoral riding associations. Delegates were selected locally. Liberal delegates submitted policy 
resolutions to the Resolutions Committee, and elected a new party leader and prime minister.
 The new Coliseum in Ottawa was fitted with dining halls, cocktail lounges and seats for 
1,300 delegates and alternates on the floor with plenty of standing room. It was also equipped 
with a press room holding over 100 rowed tables carrying type writers. On the backdrop of the 
main convention stage were larger than life pictures of Prime Ministers Wilfrid Laurier and 
William Lyon Mackenzie King. The stage walls were decorated with red, white and blue bunting 
and a sign featuring the Liberal slogan: “Security. Unity. Freedom.”42
 Convention delegates held various positions within the Liberal Party. They included MPs 
and Senators, in addition to candidates from both previous and future elections; the nine 
provincial Liberal Party leaders; Liberal Party executives; the National Federation of Liberal 
Women; the Young Liberal Federation, together with their provincial counterparts, and three 
officers from each Liberal club at post-secondary institutions; and three delegates from each 
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40 J.L. Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), 193.
41 Call For a National Convention of the Liberal Party, National Liberal Federation of Canada, 19 March 1948.
42 James Dyer, “Grit Convention Hall Like Football Field,” Vancouver Sun, 5 August 1948.
electoral constituency chosen at local annual general meetings.43 In total there were 1,302 
delegates at the convention,44 usually hand selected by the local Party power brokers in each 
riding.45 
 The rules for electing the Party leader at the 1948 convention would, for the most part, 
remain the same at subsequent Liberal conventions. The election was conducted by secret ballot. 
Only nominated candidates could stand for the Liberal Party leadership at the opening of the 
convention.46 Each of the candidates could withdraw until the chairmen announced the taking of 
a ballot or they would officially stand.47 Each ballot was counted by two returning officers 
selected from the delegates.48 The balloting continued until a candidate received the majority of 
the total votes cast.49 In the case of the 1948 convention, the winner had to receive 652 votes or 
more. Louis St Laurent’s 848 votes on the first ballot put him well over that threshold against his 
opponents.
Mackenzie King and the Leadership Candidates: Powers, Gardiner and St Laurent
 As Mackenzie King prepared to depart politics, leaving a solid legacy by 1948, historian 
Dale Thomson says that King’s preference was for St Laurent, a hardworking francophone, to 
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succeed him as leader. “St. Laurent remained his clear personal choice as the next Liberal 
leader,” Thomson asserted, “both on the basis of personal qualification and because he felt it 
would be poetic justice to hand back to a French-speaking Canadian the mantle he had inherited 
from Sir Wilfrid Laurier.”50 Historians Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn note that “nothing 
in his political life was ever left to chance, and he was determined that this, the last act, should 
proceed exactly as ordained.”51 As the convention drew closer, King grew firmer in his 
determination to have St Laurent as his successor, convinced that Liberals needed to select St 
Laurent with an overwhelming majority to sustain unity. There could be no leadership squabbles 
or public division within the Liberal ranks. This reasoning dictated that King could not let the 
campaign play out on its own.
 Charles Power was a not a serious contender for the leadership in 1948. Bothwell and 
Kilbourn, Whitaker and Thomson take this position.52 Nevertheless, Power’s unorthodox 
positions stemmed from a desire for parliamentary reform. Power ran for the leadership because 
he wanted to speak to Liberals about his views on Liberalism:
I never had anything like a glimmer of hope that I would be successful...This was the 
time, when Liberals of all shades and degrees were assembled, to set forth my views, and 
if anyone wanted to vote for them, and for what  I considered to be the true precepts of 
Liberalism, then I would give him an opportunity.53
Power thought Liberalism represented democratic values that protect people individually and 
collectively.54 The Globe and Mail reported that Power stood in support of reforming the Liberal 
18
50Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, 205.
51 Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: a Biography, 222.
52 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: a Biography, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 221; 
Whitaker, The Government Party, 176; Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1967), 236.
53 Charles Power, A Party Politician, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1966), 396.
54 Charles Power, Coliseum, Ottawa, August 7 1948.
Party and putting an end to the party’s reliance on the civil service.55 The bureaucratic nature of 
the party stood in the way of true democracy in the House of Commons, the MP for Quebec 
South alleged, and he challenged the use of “order-in-councils” allowing Cabinet to function 
without parliamentary debate. King confessed in his diary that he approved of these ideas.  
“Power stayed in to give emphasis to what he wanted to say about Liberal principles,” he noted. 
“I confess I approved very strongly of most of what Power said. I thought he made a remarkably 
good presentation.”56 Nonetheless, Power’s rogue standing in the party excluded him from being 
a serious threat to the other leadership contenders. Although prominent in Quebec, Power sat 
outside the party order. He won the 1945 General Election as an Independent but subsequently 
rejoined the Liberal Party.
 Jimmy Gardiner was a skilled Liberal politician from Saskatchewan. A former provincial 
premier, Gardiner knew how to campaign and approached the 1948 Liberal convention 
determined to win. Gardiner’s success as Minister of Agriculture had garnered support in rural 
ridings across the country, cementing a formidable base outside his home province, and he 
promised to end the strict and controlled budgets of Minister of Finance Douglas Abbott.57 
Gardiner’s leadership ambitions contrasted with his opponents. In their biography of 
Jimmy Gardiner, Norman Ward and David Smith suggest that King thought Gardiner possessed 
an unwelcoming level of ambition to be leader. “Mackenzie King said ambition drove Gardiner 
to seek the Liberal party leadership in 1948,” they concluded: “ambition so overwhelming, 
19
55 Warren Baldwin, “Return to Liberalism Power’s Cry in Joining Party Leadership Race,” Globe and Mail, 2 
August 1948, 1.
56 Mackenzie King Diaries, 7 August 1948, 2.
57 Robert Taylor, “See Austerity Budgets of Abbott Ended If Jimmy Gardiner Wins,” Toronto Daily Star, 5 August 
1948, 15.
complained the prime minister, that Gardiner actually ‘work[ed] to secure the position...for 
himself.”58 Thomson echoed this view.59 In his diary, King credits Gardiner’s campaign tactics as 
the primary reason he intervened in the leadership campaign.60 The Toronto Daily Star reported 
the Prime Minister’s support for St Laurent on the day of voting.61 Gardiner’s aggressive 
campaigning angered the prime minister, who detailed his plan of action in his diary:
I felt so disturbed over what I have learned of Gardiner’s tactics in seeking to win the 
Convention by all kinds of machine methods that  I decided I would phone to one or two 
of my colleagues and make suggestions to them which I have felt  to be necessary and in 
the interests of the party and the country. I got  Howe first; suggested to him that  he 
should allow himself to be nominated, and then before the voting, announced that he was 
withdrawing. That  everyone knew he was supporting St. Laurent and would not wish to 
take away a vote from him. He was very pleased that  I had spoken to him. Said he would 
gladly do that. Was terribly put out by what Gardiner had been doing.62
   Mackenzie King documented similar conversations with Abbott, Paul Martin, Stuart 
Garson, Brooke Claxton, and Lionel Chevrier.63 The plan was a well-thought out public relations 
maneuver. King instructed Canada’s most popular Liberals to withdraw their nominations to 
stand as candidates and support St Laurent at the last moment. Liberal delegates at the 
convention would then see that members of Cabinet, who knew St Laurent and Gardiner best, 
stood behind St Laurent. The ploy worked. The Vancouver Sun described how “a high-powered 
cabinet ‘machine’ backing External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent for leader had pretty well 
cleared the field of ‘dark horses’ as the National Liberal Convention opened today.”64 
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 Clarence Decatur Howe was a cornerstone of the Liberal Party and an important ally of 
Mackenzie King. Howe used his influence in caucus and over the Ontario Provincial Liberals to 
promote St Laurent’s candidacy. Bothwell and Kilbourn note that each of the Ontario Ministers 
owed Howe for their portfolios because he recommended them to King.65 Indeed, by April 1948 
the Manitoba MP Ralph Maybank observed that Howe was effectively St Laurent’s campaign 
manager.66 Furthermore, Howe said publicly that he would retire if anyone became leader other 
than St Laurent. The Financial Post reported, “Mr. Howe wields considerable influence in the 
counsels of the party. The fact that he will throw his weight behind Mr St. Laurent is important. 
Also important, is the implication that he will remain only if Mr. St. Laurent is the leader.”67 
 Although Garson, Abbot and Claxton all approached Mackenzie King during the 
convention and expressed second-thoughts of the plan, King ignored them. The convention 
unfolded as he had predicted in his diary. King left nothing to chance. Other delegates suspected 
of supporting Gardiner received notice to fall in line with the Prime Minister’s plan.68 Indeed, 
King eventually withdrew his neutrality and publicly voted for St Laurent at the convention 
ballot box.69
 King thought St Laurent the best Liberal to continue to lead the Party. This decision was 
part in parcel with King’s devoted life service to the Liberal Party and to Canada. In his diary, 
King recounted his support for St Laurent:
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When we stopped, the first person I met  which I was delighted to meet - was Mr. St. 
Laurent. He was wearing a great suit, like myself. I shook hands with him. Said I was 
pleased that the person with whom I shook hands, should be my successor.70 
The Liberal caucus and reporters were well aware of King’s preference by August 1948.
 Louis St Laurent was a reluctant candidate who initially showed little desire to be Liberal 
Party leader or prime minister. Thomson says that Mackenzie King presented his detailed plan to 
St Laurent, explaining that he should retire and the Minister of External Affairs should succeed 
him as chief. “Surprised to see how far the schedule had been established in Mackenzie King’s 
mind,” Thomson suggests, “St. Laurent stiffened in his resistance and declared that he could not, 
on any account, think of taking on the office.”71 Pressure mounted as Howe and Paul Martin 
pleaded with St Laurent to take the job.72 Eventually, a group of wealthy Canadians allayed St 
Laurent’s final reservations. Thomson noted:
Without  consulting him, a group of wealthy admirers had joined together to wipe out  his 
pre-war losses, and to strengthen his financial position in a way that  left  him under no 
obligation whatsoever towards the donors; he was asked to accept the arrangement on 
behalf of Canada, and as a contribution towards enabling him to continue to serve his 
country.73
A reluctant St Laurent finally agreed to have his name stand at the leadership convention, 
steering the life of his family and himself in a new direction.
Finally... A First Lady!
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 “Her eyes brimmed, her gloved hand went up to her lips, and she smiled uncertainly, a 
little dazedly,” journalist Jack Karr of the Toronto Daily Star wrote. “In that exciting moment, 
she and the rest of the country knew that she would be the First Lady.”74 The moment her 
husband won the leadership, Jeanne St Laurent became Canada’s First Lady in-waiting. An 
examination of Canadian newspapers in early August demonstrates the reverence the Canadian 
media had for Mrs. St Laurent. The wife of “Uncle Louis,” as St Laurent would later be called, 
was hailed for the personal sacrifices she and her husband made for their country during the 
Second World War. Mrs. St Laurent’s elegant smile, respectable and sophisticated fashion sense, 
and her love and affection for her children and husband featured prominently in press coverage 
across Canada. 
 All across Canada newspapers applauded the personal sacrifice of Mrs. St Laurent in 
allowing her husband to serve wartime Canada. In 1941, King’s Quebec Lieutenant Ernest 
Lapointe had passed away and left a large hole in the Liberal government. King recruited St 
Laurent to fill that role. The St Laurents picked up and moved their lives from Quebec into the 
nation’s capital. On 3 August 1948, the Toronto Daily Star noted the significant pay cut that St 
Laurent incurred by transitioning from one of Quebec’s top four lawyers to Parliament. 
Moreover, the Toronto paper detailed the difficult decision Mrs. St Laurent had in leaving behind 
her family in Quebec. The caption for a large and prominently placed photo of Mrs. St Laurent 
captured the difficulty of the decision: “WHEN HER HUSBAND was called into politics, and to 
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Ottawa in 1941, Mrs. St. Laurent accompanied him despite her reluctance to leave her home, 
family and grandchildren.”75
 A glimpse at newspapers leading up to the Convention shows a range of photos of Mrs. St 
Laurent and her family. Photos of Jeanne appeared prominently in the Toronto Daily Star, 
Winnipeg Free Press, the Globe and Mail,76 and even smaller regional papers such as the 
Kitchener-Waterloo Record. The Montreal Star noted that the St Laurent family lured 
photographers: 
Cameramen were unanimous that the St. Laurent family is the most  photogenic of the 
notables present  at the convention. Good-naturedly Mrs. Louis St. Laurent and her three 
daughters, Mrs. Mathieu Samson, Mrs. G. F. Lafferty and Mrs. Hugh O’Donnell posed 
for countless shots for photographers from all over the Dominion.77
 Convention reporters adored Mrs. St Laurent. The Winnipeg Free Press wrote about her 
instant media success, proclaiming that “the three-score reporters and photographers who trailed 
them from the moment he [Louis St Laurent] became party leader decided she’s terrific.”78 The 
reporters anticipated that Mrs. St Laurent was going to be a great asset to Canada’s highest 
political office.79 In the Kitchener-Waterloo Record, the next First Lady stood in the middle of a 
photograph between her husband and King.80 Only a couple of days after the convention closed, 
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the Winnipeg Free Press presented a small biography and backgrounder on the wife of the new 
Liberal leader. The article commented on the high quality of her English language skills, her 
childhood, her social life and how she had met her husband. 81
By contrast, the Canadian media showed little endearment for Mrs. Gardiner or Mrs. 
Power.82 This coverage demonstrates the interest in a St Laurent leadership expanded far beyond 
the inner circles of the Liberal Party. The media demonstrated significant interest in examining St  
Laurent’s life far more closely than his opponents. This media presence indicates a clear 
preference exercised by journalists and newspaper editors. The Globe and Mail provided the 
most in-depth coverage of these candidates’ wives, with comments about Mrs. Gardiner 
restricted to her physical appearance and her likable personality.83 Similarly, the article focused 
on the physical appearance of Mrs. Power and her prevailing family interests.84 The image of 
Mrs St Laurent was far more thorough and popular, confirming the media’s unflinching 
confidence that she and her husband were well suited to lead the country.
Youth in Revolt: The Young Liberal Federation in Convention
 The Young Liberal Federation and the University Liberal clubs were among the most 
progressive Liberal delegates at the 1948 convention, sending a combined total of 81 delegates.85 
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Although they represented little more than six percent of the delegates, Liberal youth played a 
significance role in shaping discussions around party rejuvenation. 
 On 4 August 1948, William Lyon Mackenzie King found a crowd of Canadian University 
students with banners cheering at his front door at Laurier House. When the Prime Minister 
stepped outside, the students broke out in a chorus of “He’s a Jolly Good Fellow.” After a few 
moments, King thanked the students for coming to honour his service. He recorded in his diary:
Spoke of the pleasure it was to me to have this greeting on the eve of the opening of the 
Convention; of the happiness that I knew it would have given to Sir Wilfrid and Lady 
Laurier to know of this greeting, and of their remembrance of a great  leader whose 
footsteps I had sought  to follow. I then spoke of the words: Unity, Security and 
Freedom...86
The next day, newspapers across the country reported the visit. In the Winnipeg Free Press, the 
story “Prime Minister Serenaded” received front page coverage, outlining how 1,000 students 
marched from the University of Ottawa to King’s house in a parade, chanting “We want Willie!” 
and “three cheers for Mackenzie King.”87 The Montreal Star claimed that a more modest crowd 
of 100 students stood outside King’s house to pay tribute, with a page two headline titled, 
“University Students Pay Tribute to Premier.”88 Similar to the Winnipeg Free Press report, the 
Globe and Mail reported that 1,000 students came to see the Prime Minister.89 Le Devoir also 
covered the story, but did not report the number of students.90 It would be one of the last 
moments Young Liberals appeared united with the rest of the Party.
26
86 Mackenzie King Diaries, 4 August 1948, 4.
87 “Prime Minister Serenaded,” Winnipeg Free Press, 5 August 1948, 1.
88 “University Students Pay Tribute to Premier,” Montreal Star, 5 August 1948, 2.
89 “‘We Want Willy,’ Students Yell Mr. King Appears on Doorstep,” Globe and Mail, 5 August 1948, 13.
90 “Un hommage au premier ministre,” Le Devoir, 5 August 1948.
 The convention was the Young Liberals’ first experience drafting policy. According to the 
Winnipeg Free Press, most of the youth delegates considered policy questions far more important 
than the leadership race itself.91 Indeed, they arrived in Ottawa a day early for a gathering of 
their own,92 offering recommendations on nearly every contentious political issue of the time.93 
Their proposals included a change to the British North America Act that would allow the 
Dominion of Canada to change its constitution independently of Great Britain.94 Moreover, they 
recommended that the provincial governments appoint two-thirds of the Senate, and that the 
Senate’s property and citizenship requirements be removed.95 Furthermore, they called on 
Canada to adopt a Canadian flag that did not incorporate either French or English cultural 
identity.96
 The Young Liberals tabled policy resolutions that the rest of the Party was not ready to 
accept whilst opposing resolutions proposed by older Liberals. The Toronto Daily Star reported 
that the Young Liberals rallied to defeat a resolution concerning employment and a higher 
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standard of living introduced by Walter Tucker, Saskatchewan Liberal leader.97 According to the 
report, members of the Ontario Liberal caucus dismissed the Young Liberals as “boy scouts.”98 
James Paterson, a Young Liberal, told the Toronto Daily Star that the resolution had no binding 
consequences and that voting for it only reinforced that the Liberal Party has no plan for their 
struggles:
It’s going to be difficult for any delegate to go home and convince his people that  this 
convention has accomplished anything at  all if we keep on passing such innocuous and 
meaningless resolutions,” he declared. “We know that  the country is suffering inflation, 
and that the high cost of living is bringing hardship to thousands of families, but so far 
there is no indication this convention intends to do anything about it.99
Moreover, some Young Liberal recommendations were altered or weakened before they were 
accepted by the Resolution Committee. For example, the committee significantly changed the 
Young Liberal resolution on a new Canadian flag in an attempt to mitigate perceived conflict 
between francophones and anglophones. This change stresses the oversight of senior Liberals.
 According to Bothwell and Kilbourn, the Young Liberals disturbances at the Convention 
were “hushed in the overwhelming atmosphere of loyalty and propriety.”100 Nevertheless, 
Whitaker suggests that the friction between the youth delegates and the elder members of the 
party represented a significant problem. The Young Liberals felt that the older members of the 
Party constrained their progressive stance on issues affecting Canadians. “People over 60 are 
doing most of the talking here and apparently they are doing most of the voting too, and it is a 
dismal day for liberalism in Canada when that happens,” Paterson told the Toronto Daily Star.101 
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The report cajoled older Liberals to listen to their younger voices, with the inference that “the 
Liberal party might do well to pay more attention to what young people say and think.”102 
Despite disputes within the party ranks, prominent Young Liberal Dalton Camp told the Globe 
and Mail and the Toronto Daily Star that his peers were not dissuaded by the policy debates.103 
Camp warned that if the Young Liberals were ignored outright, the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation would welcome them with open arms.104 Based on his conversations with Camp, 
Whitaker insists that Liberal youth were outraged at the thought of keeping their opinions to 
themselves, whether on policy or intra-party dissatisfaction.105
 The Young Liberal Federation and University Liberal Clubs represented a tiny minority 
of convention delegates and consequently their proposals found little policy traction. 
Nevertheless, the Young Liberals’ resolutions provoked conversations amongst party members at 
the convention and in the national press. Most Young Liberals stayed under the “Big Red Tent” 
and many of their ideas were ultimately adopted by St Laurent, Lester Pearson and Pierre 
Trudeau. Accordingly, the Young Liberals ultimately helped to facilitate rejuvenation within the 
party, as they had aspired to do.
The Woes of What Could Have Been: Paul Martin and the Liberal Leadership
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 Paul Martin, 45, was an up and coming member of Parliament for the Ontario riding of 
Essex-East, a progressive Liberal, and Minister of National Health and Welfare. With Martin’s 
ambition well-known, Liberals and the Canadian media questioned his interest in the party 
leadership. The Windsor-area MP had serious concerns with King’s manipulation of the 
leadership race, but he participated in the outgoing leader’s ploys nonetheless. St Laurent told 
Martin that this may be his last chance to run given that Canadians would be unlikely to accept 
two consecutive French Catholic leaders. Despite Martin’s ambitions, his concerns about King’s 
tactics, and St Laurent’s warnings, Martin declined to contest the leadership and opted to support 
St Laurent.
 Martin let his name stand for nomination at the 1948 convention with the intention of 
withdrawing his candidacy and supporting St Laurent. This strategy was conceived by the wily 
Mackenzie King. This was a difficult decision for Martin, who dreamed of being prime minister. 
In his memoir, Martin professes that he felt conflicted about his career in politics, especially 
around the times of leadership contests:
I have often reflected on the effort  it  required to achieve my initial place in public life; the 
process of gaining the nomination was a very tedious one. At  first, all I wanted to do was 
to keep my foot in the door and make a good showing. Certainly I had no desire to spend 
all my time greeting people and speechifying, but I got so involved that  I could not pull 
away. Contradictory as it may appear, I felt  my priorities should lie elsewhere... It 
confronted me again after Mackenzie King’s retirement in 1948, and once more when I 
ran against Mike Pearson for the Liberal leadership a decade later.106
Martin did not admit to seeking the leadership in 1948, but intimated that he considered it.107
 Support for a Martin leadership bid began at the grassroots level of the Liberal Party. The 
Toronto Daily Star reported that the “Draft Martin” campaign began in Martin’s home region of 
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southwestern Ontario. In Nova Scotia, reports from the Chronicle Herald predicted Martin to be 
a serious contender. Norman MacLeod reported that Martin is “probably the most serious 
contender for the party leadership crown,”108 emphasizing Martin’s youth and energy on the 
campaign trail.109 The Kitchener-Waterloo Record and Le Devoir reported that Martin had a bloc 
of delegate support from 24 Western Ontario ridings.110 A similar report appeared in the Montreal 
Star.111 The Vancouver Sun predicted that a Martin candidacy could thwart St Laurent of the 
leadership.112 Other journalists reported that the “Draft Martin” movement was spreading to 
other regions. The Globe and Mail reported that Liberal support for Martin spread into central 
Ontario, while the Winnipeg Free Press reported that party members in British Columbia echoed 
similar sounds of support. 
In the end, Martin refused to seek the leadership, withdrew his nomination, and supported 
St Laurent’s candidacy.  Mackenzie King’s tactics compromised Martin’s position. Martin 
believed that the contest should be open for anyone to enter but he also believed that no one 
could beat St Laurent. “I felt abused,” he admitted later. “Did not I, too, have the right to join my 
colleagues in an honorary nomination? This legerdemain confirmed my feeling that the 
convention was contravening the principles of liberalism: it should be open to any member of the 
party to seek the leadership.”113 Martin compared his situation to that of Mackenzie King’s in 
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1919: “after all, he was then forty-five, exactly my age in 1948. King was being hypocritical. 
What would he have said or done in 1919 if he had been told that he should not contest the 
Liberal leadership against the great W.S. Fielding, George Graham or D.D. McKenzie?”114 
Principle aside, Martin knew that St Laurent was going to win and thus he threw his support 
behind him. A Gallup poll around the time of the convention showed that support for Martin was 
well behind that of St Laurent. 39 percent of Liberal supporters felt that St Laurent would be the 
best leader in comparison to 8 percent for Gardiner, 3 percent for James Ilsley, and 2 percent for 
Martin.115 Without a viable shot at assuming the leadership, he was politically sage to support the 
leading candidate and secure a strong position within the future administration.
 The question remained whether Liberals, or Canadians for that matter, supported another 
francophone, Roman Catholic Prime Minister? St Laurent had deep concerns about that question. 
At the 1948 Convention alternance was in its early stages and the issues surrounding race and 
religion remained critical concerns. Martin recalled in his memoirs how “St Laurent told a 
Winnipeg audience that he was ready to seek the leadership if his candidacy provoked no racial 
or religious objects.”116 Although Martin believed race and religion had no bearing in the 
contest,117 St Laurent’s biographer Thomson offered a different opinion:
Paul Martin, whose heart had been set since childhood on becoming prime minister, also 
pleaded with him to do so [to run for leadership]; St. Laurent  advised the ambitious 
young minister that  he was making a mistake, for even if Canadians accepted one French-
speaking Catholic as prime minister, they could certainly not accept two in a row, and the 
32
114 Ibid, 13.
115 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, “Gallup Poll of Canada: 39 P.C. Liberal Supporters Would Choose St. 
Laurent,” Toronto Daily Star, 4 August 1948.
116 Ibid, 6.
117 Ibid.
result might  well be that  he would never realize his ambition, but  Martin maintained his 
position.118
Accordingly, Martin would be an unlikely successor to St Laurent. In its coverage of St 
Laurent’s victory, Le Devoir discussed the importance of a French-speaking Roman Catholic 
once again leading the Liberal Party:
M. St-Laurent se dit  très ému du très grand honneur que le parti libéral vient  pour la 
seconde fois en son histoire d'accorder à un Canadien de langue française. C'est le parti 
libéral, dit-il en français, qui a posé il y 60 ans le premier geste qui a démontré qu'il 
voulait être un parti dans lequel un Canadien de quelque origine, de quelque religion ou 
de quelque langue qu'il fut, pouvait aspirer au plus haut poste du parti. Ce geste est 
confirmé aujourd'hui et  il constitue la preuve de la largeur d'esprit des membres anglais 
du parti libéral et  de leur désir de nous tendre la main et nous voulons, nous prendre leur 
main et la serrer et coopérer pour le plus grand bien de ce pays.119
St Laurent’s prediction about the party leadership proved to be true. Martin’s chances in 1958 
were hindered by both language and religion. Alternance was becoming Liberal doctrine, and 
Martin’s leadership aspirations would prove to be a casualty of it.
Conclusion
 St Laurent’s first ballot victory cemented the Liberal Party leadership. Despite King’s 
involvement, the Party overwhelmingly elected St Laurent. Saturday Night characterized St 
Laurent’s victory as essential for the Liberal Party. Wilfrid Eggleston asserted that “to pass [St 
Laurent] over in favor of an English-speaking Canadian would have been regarded as an affront 
to Quebec.”120 St Laurent’s francophone identity was part of King’s calculation. Selecting St 
Laurent by an overwhelming margin ensured party and broader national unity. This victory 
verifies Courtney’s assertion that in 1948 the parliamentary wing of the party had significant 
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influence over the leadership selection process. St Laurent’s significant support within cabinet 
and caucus assisted him in securing large delegate support. Furthermore, Herbert F. Quinn and 
B.K. Sandwell observed that the outcome demonstrated that policy development and leadership 
selection remained in the hands of the party elite.121
 The 1948 leadership candidates positioned themselves differently. Power’s role was to 
editorialize about the state of affairs for the Liberal Party. Gardiner ran to climb the political 
ladder. Indeed, he campaigned so fervently that he looked self-serving in comparison to his 
opponents. By contrast, St Laurent stood as the man with no desire to be there other than to serve 
his party and his country. Reports swirled about his family’s sacrifice and his ability to be 
successful outside of Canadian politics. St Laurent was measured by a different standard. 
Paul Martin decided that the 1948 Convention was not the time to seek the Liberal 
leadership. Although Martin concurred that St Laurent was the best candidate and delivered him 
an endorsement, he did so sparingly. Martin’s frustration with King cannot be ignored. He 
wanted to be Prime Minister, but even Martin conceded that no one could have bested St 
Laurent. The Quebecker was the strongest candidate, and Martin knew that St Laurent, at the age 
of 66, could not be Liberal leader for long. Therefore, Martin bided his time, anticipating the 
next leadership convention.
 The experienced, steady hands of William Lyon Mackenzie King were all over the 1948 
convention. The outgoing Liberal Prime Minister ensured that his chosen successor took over the 
mantle of power. From the beginning, King was certain that St Laurent would win. He had the 
support of the key players in Cabinet and party captains across the country. King’s involvement 
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in the leadership contest stemmed from the need to ensure the Liberal Party was united behind St  
Laurent, and he left office convinced that his legacy was secure. Although some consider King’s 
presence at the 1948 Convention a contradiction of Liberal democratic principles, he was 
motivated by the same considerations that guided him through his tenures as prime minister. 
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CHAPTER THREE
A COMMON CAUSE: PAUL MARTIN SR., LESTER PEARSON AND THE 1958 
NATIONAL LIBERAL LEADERSHIP CONVENTION
Almost the last words I want to leave with you to-night are words of Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier. In the greatest of all his speeches--made in 1877 in the city  of Quebec, 
which has been the home of so many great Liberal leaders--he said: “I am a Liberal. 
I am one of those who think that everywhere in human things there are abuses to be 
reformed, new horizons to be opened up, and new forces to be developed.” – Lester 
B. Pearson
    
 On 16 January 1958, Lester Pearson assumed the Liberal leadership with grace. He 
acknowledged the legacy of Laurier and committed himself to a united Liberal Party, extending 
an immediate hand of friendship to his colleague and rival Paul Martin:
Mr. St Laurent, fellow delegates, my first  words at this time must be of thanks to those 
delegates who supported me and helped me in this quest of mine for the Liberal 
leadership. And may I take this opportunity to thank those who discharged their duty and 
their privilege by voting for the other candidate for this position, my friend and colleague 
of the past  and of the future, Paul Martin. We have worked together in the past in 
friendship and in unity. We have been close together. We were even close together in 
competition for the leadership of the Liberal party, and you would be surprised how often 
we exchanged confidences as to how things were going.122
Party unity remained an essential part of the convention process, necessitating a strong 
relationship between Pearson and Martin in which they could set aside their personal ambitions 
and work together for the good of the party. An aura of unity, both in public and in private, was 
the Liberals best hope to move from the Opposition benches to the seats of power.
 The Liberal Party had ended 1957 with an unprecedented defeat. It had lost its first 
election since 1930, its leader resigned, and many key Liberals with leadership potential had lost 
their seat in the House of Commons. When the 1958 National Liberal Leadership Convention 
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met at the Coliseum in Ottawa from 14-16 January, the race for succession was between three 
Liberals: Lester B. Pearson, age 61,123 Paul Martin, 55, 124 and Reverend Harold Henderson, 
51.125 Pearson won in an overwhelming fashion on the first ballot with 1,074 votes compared to 
Martin’s 305 and Henderson’s 1.126
 The historiography of the 1958 Convention resides in the biographies of key Liberals 
such as Lester B. Pearson, Louis St Laurent, C.D. Howe and Jean Chrétien. It also includes 
Christina McCall’s Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party, Paul Martin Jr.’s memoir 
Hell or High Water: My Life In and Out of Politics and Paul Martin Sr.’s memoir. These studies 
detail how Pearson and Martin were perceived by their colleagues and grassroots Liberals alike. 
Their political views, known and unknown, were important considerations for influential 
Liberals in choosing who to support. These decisions remained critical as the parliamentary wing 
of the Liberal Party retained considerable control over the leadership election.
 Throughout his long career in Liberal politics Martin had advocated left-leaning policies. 
By contrast, Pearson had no perceived interest outside of Canadian foreign relations and his time 
in the St Laurent Cabinet allowed him to focus his attention there. Bothwell and Kilbourn note 
that Howe believed Martin to be too left-leaning to become party leader, but Pearson’s lack of 
experience in domestic affairs never concerned the “minister of everything.”127 Paul Martin Jr. 
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confirms in his memoirs that his father was too left-leaning for some Liberals. Martin had been 
front and centre in the social reform debates while Pearson had focused his attentions on 
international politics. “Although he was a true social reformer and later brought in medicare as 
prime minister,” Martin Jr. writes, “Pearson had not participated in many of the party’s social 
reform debates of the early 1950s, in which my father, as minister of health and welfare had been 
at the centre.”128 English echoes this view. “Few knew where Pearson stood, and that was an 
advantage” his biographer observed. “ Liberals and others rightly regarded Paul Martin as being 
on the left.”129 In his memoirs, Martin Sr. acknowledged that “Liberals of the C.D. Howe school 
thought of me as a closet socialist and resented my pushing social welfare measures, hospital 
insurance most of all.”130 Right-leaning Liberals had a difficult time accepting Martin, and 
Pearson’s relatively unknown positions on domestic politics raised fewer concerns.
 This chapter clarifies a point that the historiography fails to state firmly. Christina McCall 
notes Pearson’s reluctance to embrace the role of Liberal leader. This chapter demonstrates that 
Pearson sought the prime minister’s office with the same basic desire that motivated Martin. 
Pearson matched Martin throughout the 1958 leadership race in effort to win. Pearson’s portrayal 
of reluctance to seek the leadership was a political fabrication to win over the Liberal Party. 
 This chapter explores four main themes. First, it considers the front-runner status 
attributed to Lester Pearson by the Canadian media, and the status of Paul Martin as underdog. It 
also analyzes the regional support that Pearson developed across the country.  Second, this 
chapter considers the press coverage afforded to Maryon Pearson and Eleanor Martin. Third, it 
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reviews the campaign tactics of Martin and Pearson, exploring both traditional strategies and 
new practices. The chapter also discusses the evolution of alternance as Liberal Party doctrine by 
the time of the 1958 convention. Fourth, the chapter assesses the relationship between Pearson 
and Martin during the leadership race, its impact on their friendship, and the role the duo played 
in stabilizing the Liberal Party.
10 Years Later: Back at the Coliseum
  On September 6 1957 the Rt. Hon. Louis St Laurent, former Prime Minister of Canada 
and Leader of the Official Opposition, notified Duncan K. MacTavish, President of the National 
Liberal Federation, that he intended to retire after a successor was chosen at a leadership 
convention.131 Each of the 265 ridings sent three delegates for the convention. In addition, other 
delegates were made up of Liberal MPs and Senators, in addition to either the previous or future 
Liberal candidates; the members of the Executive Committees for the National Liberal 
Federation of Canada, the Young Liberal Federation of Canada, and the Canadian University 
Liberal Federation; the presidents and two other officers of each of the ten Provincial Liberal 
associations; the Provincial organizations of Liberal Women; the Provincial organizations of the 
Young Liberals; as well as the president and two other officers of each of the university Liberal 
clubs in Canada.132 There were 1,534 delegates and 942 alternate delegates at the convention.133 
The Toronto Daily Star reported that eighty per cent of delegates were attending their first 
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convention134 and only 10 per cent of delegates had been to the 1948 Convention.135 The rules 
for electing the leader would be the same as they were in 1948.136 Unlike 1948, Louis St Laurent 
refused to involve himself in the leadership race as King had done.
 St Laurent stayed impartial prior to and during the 1958 Convention. Dale C. Thomson 
notes that the former Prime Minister and his wife preferred Pearson but they refused to make any  
indication publicly.137 John English suggests that although Pearson never mentioned it in his 
memoirs St Laurent likely gave him his support in private.138 Nevertheless, the retiring Liberal 
leader let the convention play out, apparently unconcerned that the Party could spin out of 
control and into division. This is the concern King had in 1948. Fortunately for Liberals, Lester 
Pearson and Paul Martin sought to take St Laurent’s place. The stakes were higher than ever as 
Canadians had the opportunity to see the race unfold live on television.
 The Liberal Party Convention Committee sought to ensure the atmosphere would transfer 
to the new medium of television. The venue had to accommodate camera platforms, areas for 
interviews, panel discussions and special broadcasts. The CBC became the official broadcaster 
and enlisted a crew of 200 people to assemble the sets and 150 people to broadcast.139 CBC 
offered immediate translation services for their English television and radio as well as French 
television and radio broadcasts.140 The efforts sought to make the convention a political spectacle 
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for all Canadians. Lessons remained to be learned, and it took Liberals time to develop this 
production. 
Front-Runner Politics: Pearson Without Reservation
 Headlines such as “Pearson Seen Shoo-in As Three Enter Race” appeared across the 
country in the days prior to the convention.141 Pearson enjoyed front-runner status, similar to 
Louis St Laurent in 1948. The Canadian media portrayed Pearson as the leader-in-waiting, with 
strong support throughout the Liberal caucus. Pearson predicted himself to win on the first 
ballot.142 By contrast, Martin was cast the underdog. Martin eventually adopted this theme in his 
own campaign, and it gained more traction in the press. But the outlook remained poor for 
Martin heading into the leadership vote in the evening of 16 January 1958. 
 Pearson’s Nobel Prize in 1957 for his efforts to prevent war during the Suez Crisis made 
him a particularly attractive candidate. The historiography suggests that the prize all but assured 
Pearson of the Liberal leadership.143 English argues that the Nobel Prize demonstrated that 
Pearson fit in well with the world’s most influential leaders, an aura that no other Liberal could 
match: 
As a world statesman, Pearson had already shown that  the home town boy can bat  with 
the best  of them in the biggest  league of all. And Canadians like their prime minister to be 
a man they can be proud of in any company. Indeed they did, and do, and the Nobel Peace 
Prize, announced in October 1957, assured Pearson of the victory. As momentum thrust 
him forward others clung to him, not for the ride so much as for the change to influence 
his direction.144
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In 1957 Pearson emerged as Canada’s premier international statesman. “Mike Pearson’s best 
claim to the leadership is not his undoubted popularity, his common touch,” journalist John Bird 
said. “It is that indefinable thing called ‘size.’ He is a big-time man, big enough to be a 
leader.”145 The former Secretary of State for External Affairs rode that reputation to the 
leadership of the Liberal Party and eventually to the Prime Minister’s Office.
 Lawrence Martin suggests that when Jean Chrétien arrived at the 1958 Convention as a 
Young Liberal delegate it was all but known that Pearson would be the next leader.146 On 8 
January 1958 the Toronto Daily Star asserted in its convention coverage that Pearson was the 
front-runner.147 Meanwhile the Montreal Star was already speculating on the next federal 
election and what it meant for the Liberals under Pearson. James A. Oastler wrote that the main 
“reason for not seeking an election at this point is the Liberal fear that it will take more than six 
weeks to convince the voters that the Pearson government is not the same as the St. Laurent 
government.”148 The Globe and Mail and the Montreal Star echoed these reports until the vote 
itself.149 On 9 January the Toronto Daily Star even delivered an endorsement for Pearson. “In 
moving to the leadership of the Liberals and probably in due course to prime minister,” the 
editorial proclaimed, “he would be able to speak and direct foreign policy with the added 
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authority of the head of the government.”150 Furthermore, the same editorial suggested that 
Pearson had earned the right to be leader.151 
 In Patrick Brennan’s Reporting the Nation’s Business, he observes that Pearson’s friends 
in the media -- Grant Dexter, Bruce Hutchison, George Ferguson, and Blair Fraser -- helped 
Pearson become Liberal leader. “For the likes of Fraser, Ferguson, Dexter, and Hutchison, whose 
perennial boosting of Pearson had become almost a full-time sideline to their regular work, 
seeing he got the top job became an obsession.”152 Furthermore, Brennan says their efforts 
extended to the derailment of Martin’s campaign. “While all of them considered Martin an egoist 
and a self-promoter...the overriding reason for opposing him was that he dared to challenge their 
favourite’s steady advance to the top.”153 John English observes similar dynamics.154 Martin 
wrote in his memoirs that he had caught on to the plan: “some of Mike’s cronies in the press 
sought to put forward the view that he was just sitting back and leaving the politicking to me, 
[but] this was far from true.”155 Martin’s perspective had validity. Pearson’s front-runner status in 
the days leading up to the Convention created momentum that Martin was unable to match. The 
similarity of the Martin and Pearson campaigns was clear but was indistinguishable in the press.
   Jean Chrétien firmly embraced Martin’s role as the long shot when he arrived at the 
convention and for this reason he decided to support the former Health and Welfare minister.156 
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Paul Martin eventually incorporated this underdog status into his own quotes. “It’s going to be 
1919 all over again,” the leadership hopeful quipped to Toronto Daily Star reporter J.E. 
Belliveau, referring to the 1919 Convention when Mackenzie King won the Liberal Party 
leadership.157 The media embraced Martin’s rhetoric. “Trailing far behind his main opponent,” 
Bruce MacDonald wrote, “Hon. Paul Martin is beginning to force pace by taking on the self-
styled role of an underdog battling against entrenched authority.”158 The Toronto Daily Star ran 
the headline “Underdog Martin Fights to Cut Pearson’s Lead,” topping a narrative that was pure 
fiction spun by the former Health and Welfare minister himself:
Mr. Martin seeking to capitalize on his position as the underdog, has been working 
feverishly to align himself with the party grassroots in a movement against the party 
‘brass,’ represented by all those former cabinet  ministers, senators and other who for so 
long have controlled the destiny of the party.159
 The day of the leadership vote the Kitchener-Waterloo Record ran a story linking 
Martin’s underdog status with the grassroots of the Liberal Party. Speaking to delegates, Martin 
preached that the grassroots needed to take control of the Party. “He emphasized the leadership 
should not be imposed on the convention,” the story suggested. “It must come from the rank and 
file.”160 Martin spun a false story of grassroots revolt, but Pearson still won by an overwhelming 
margin. Although no permanent damage was done, such claims could have damaged the Liberal 
Party outwardly and within its organization.
 The Toronto Daily Star reported that Pearson was going to win significant support from 
Western delegates. They reported that British Columbia delegates were solidly behind Pearson, 
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quoting a prominent Liberal that “Our rank and file is almost completely for Pearson.”161 The 
Alberta delegates told the Toronto Daily Star that they would remain publicly uncommitted to 
any of the candidates until the Convention got under way, but the paper still suggested Pearson 
was likely their preference.162 Walter Gordon confirmed the Toronto Daily Star’s calculated 
guess in his memoirs. “All of them owned large ranches and all held university degrees, about 
half of them Ph.D.’s in Agriculture Economics,” Gordon wrote. “I have no doubt that all the 
Alberta delegates had decided [Pearson] would be their choice for leader.”163 In Saskatchewan 
the accounts of Pearson’s support remained speculative, but Grant Maxwell noted that 
“unofficially those close to the 100 Saskatchewan delegates entitled to vote guess they will go 
two-to-one for Lester B. Pearson.”164 In Manitoba the Toronto Daily Star offered its most 
resounding endorsement. “If the choice for the national Liberal leadership depended only on 
votes of Manitoba delegates,” L.F. Earl wrote, “the honor would go to Lester B. Pearson.”165 One 
day later the Winnipeg Free Press suggested similar expectations from the Manitoba Liberal 
delegates. “Most of the delegates leaving Manitoba Saturday night for the Liberal convention in 
Ottawa next week have indicated that Mr. Pearson is their first choice.”166 Ultimately Pearson’s 
significant margin of victory suggests that these reports were accurate. Pearson was the candidate 
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English-speaking Liberals wanted: an anglophone Protestant who would win English-Canadian 
seats lost to the Conservatives in Ontario and the Maritimes. 
 The race between a French-speaking Catholic and an English-speaking Protestant created 
significant discussion about whom the majority of the Quebec delegates would ultimately 
support. Pierre Vigeant reported that Quebec Liberals were falling unenthusiastically behind 
Pearson. “Quebec delegates to the forthcoming Liberal convention may give a majority vote to 
Lester B. Pearson,” he wrote, “but it will not be enthusiastic support.”167 Vigeant suggested that 
their support was conflicting with their interest in Martin, and that ultimately Quebec delegates 
were leaning towards Pearson because Martin’s chances were unpropitious. Moreover, Vigeant 
asserted that their consideration for Martin is reflects the absence of George C. Marler168 and 
Lionel Chevrier169 in the race.170 A few days later the Montreal Star reported that the majority of 
the Quebec delegates were going to support Pearson. “It seems that three quarters of the Quebec 
delegates favor Pearson” journalist Fernand Renault quoted from a delegate leaving the Quebec 
delegate’s caucus.171 Another delegate was quoted as stating: “I guess if we acted according to 
our hearts we would vote for Martin. But we have to be practical, you know.” Simply put, 
Renault concluded, “Quebeckers expect Mr. Pearson to be the winner and this is obviously one 
of the reasons why they have joined the ‘I like Mike’ movement.”172 
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In an editorial, Le Devoir suggested that Pearson would be an unpopular candidate in 
Quebec and that Paul Martin would be the Liberal Party’s best choice. R. R. Desaulneirs of Le 
Devoir wrote that “[l]es libéraux furent défaits dans toutes les provinces sauf celle de Québec et 
leur seule espérance de survie comme parti est de soigner les electeur de cette province. Paul 
Martin demeure leur seule et derniere chance.”173 Moreover, Le Devoir challenged the view that 
Quebec delegates were following Liberal MPs to support Pearson:
Selon nos informations, à peu près tous les anciens miniatres libéraux sont des partisans 
de M. Pearson de même que la majorite des députes quebecois. Mais cela ne veut pas 
necessairement dire; d'apres certains commentateurs, que les délégations voilent du même 
oeil le probléme de le chefferie.174
However, Guy Lamarche of Le Devoir reported two days later that a large number of Quebec 
delegates would in fact be supporting Pearson.175 
 Beal argues that Pearson lacked support from members of the old-guard in the Liberal 
Party who had served in the days of King. This group “included a number of old-guard cabinet 
ministers and former ministers who still carried great weight in party councils and who were 
dubious about Pearson as the right man to lead an organization that would have to fight hard to 
regain power.”176 Furthermore, Beal suggests that Pearson’s persona weighed against him:
Many senior Liberals looked on Pearson as a ‘do-gooder’ type; a darling of the eggheads; 
a man who didn’t  understand what back-room politics was all about; a man, in fact, who 
even had an active distaste for the all the cornball practices required in democracies for 
the winning of political power.177
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Bothwell and Kilbourn counter Beal, observing that Howe supported Pearson in private.178 These 
historians also note that Howe refused Martin’s plea for support.179 Moreover, English argues 
that Pearson had significant support in the Party – “not only of Liberal youth but also of ‘nearly 
two-thirds’ of the Liberal MPs who had sat in the last House of Commons and who could be 
expected to exercise their influence in support of Mike in their constituencies.”180 Furthermore, 
Pearson enjoyed the support of staunch Liberals such as Jimmy Sinclair,181 Jack Pickersgill,182 
and Howe.183 Sinclair was first elected in 1945 and became a member of St Laurent’s cabinet. 
Pickersgill was a longtime secretary to King and became a leading member of the Official 
Opposition for the Liberals against John Diefenbaker’s Government and serving as Government 
House Leader during Pearson’s years as prime minister in a string of minority governments. 
These bona fide supporters had considerable influence in Liberal circles.
The Other Contest: Maryon Pearson or Eleanor Martin?
 Days before the 1958 Convention opened, the Globe and Mail first reported on the wives 
of the leadership contenders.184 The articles characterize Maryon Pearson as the quintessential 
diplomat’s wife. Her interviews create the impression that she and her husband lived an irregular 
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Canadian life. The articles included little on the Pearson family and focused more on their 
worldly pursuits. By contrast, the interviews with Eleanor Martin portrayed a household with 
family front and centre. Mrs. Martin’s praised her children and was quick to defend her husband. 
These portrayals of the wives resembled the portrayal of the candidates themselves: the worldly, 
well-liked, internationally-praised Lester Pearson, and the hardworking, long-serving, ultimate 
partisan, Paul Martin. Martin’s considerable international experience received limited attention in 
the press or party circles in comparison to that of Pearson.
 Reporters clung to Maryon Pearson’s international prestige as well as her domesticity: her 
interests in cooking and dancing, as well as her uncanny ability at making a new home in cities 
all over the world.185 “[Mike] likes eating at home and is very flattering about my cooking,” 
Maryon. Pearson told the Winnipeg Free Press.186 Even more, the Pearson children and five 
grandchildren reinforced Mrs. Pearson’s commitment to her family. Regardless, media portrayals 
of Mrs.  Pearson focused on her eccentric life as a diplomat’s wife, and thus were substantively 
different from portrayals of Eleanor Martin. According to the Montreal Star, Mrs. Pearson 
maintained a six-bedroom apartment home in Ottawa but has a housekeeper come in once a 
week.187 The Pearson home was filled with gifts they received on their many travels around the 
world.188 Quite expectedly the wife of Lester Pearson came off relatively out of touch with the 
average Canadian. “Mrs. Pearson wishes now that she had counted the number of times she has 
crossed the Atlantic,” one Montreal Star story noted, “but she has long since lost track.”189 
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Nonetheless, Maryon indicated her connection to Canadiana. Be it the oil paintings by Canadian 
artists or her fascination for Canadian literature, Mrs. Pearson demonstrated an abiding and 
continuing interest with Canadian culture.190 
 The home of Eleanor Martin was far from the home of Pearson. Nell, as her friends 
affectionately called her, suggested in an interview with the Montreal Star that “my job is to keep 
our home running smoothly and I don’t think the public wants anything further from me.”191 
Mrs. Martin put her role as a homemaker first. “On the eve of the convention,” Helen Boyd 
reported, “Mrs. Martin was more concerned that there were enough minute steaks in the deep 
freeze and enough bedding for out of town friends than about what she would wear.”192 There 
was no mention of Eleanor’s profession as a pharmacist or her handling of the Martin finances. 
Journalists portrayed her simply as a mother and wife. This image stands in contrast to Mrs. 
Pearson, who quipped that she did not know what to wear at the convention.193 Nell talks about 
her insistence that her children become fully bilingual and receive great education.194 The Martin 
living room is filled with family portraits, Canadian art, and cartoons drawn of Mr. Martin 
through his long career as a politician. Her only concern with her husband’s career was the 
difficult toll it took on their family.195 Like Mrs. Pearson, unnamed sources in media reports 
criticized Eleanor Martin for not befriending wives of Liberal MPs.196 Although she admitted to 
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refraining from talking politics, Eleanor Martin expressed her distaste for alternance. “I believe 
strongly in toleration,” she attests, “and feel that since my husband has the qualifications of a 
leader he should not be discriminated against because of race or religion.”197 Although she 
offered no comment in 1968, Mrs. Martin’s recorded position is interesting in light of her 
husband running towards alternance at the next convention.
An Evolving Practice of Party Politics: How to Win a Leadership Convention
 The 1958 National Liberal Leadership Convention demonstrated a fundamental shift in 
the methods utilized by Liberals to win their Party’s leadership. By the time of the 1958 
leadership race it was no longer practice to show up with no organization. Both Pearson and 
Martin took opportunities to prepare for the 1958 Convention, contacting individual delegates by  
letter and even telephone to try to recruit them to their side.
 Pearson is adamant in his memoirs that he did not seek the leadership. The former 
diplomat contended that he simply allowed his name to stand: “Moreover, I was not accepting, or 
even seeking, a new position for which, frankly, I had no particular desire. I was merely allowing 
my name to go before the convention which would make the decision.”198 These comments are 
disingenuous. He clearly wanted to succeed St Laurent. Furthermore, Pearson actively 
campaigned for the job. “The leadership contest was an easy one for me,” he recalled. “Indeed, it 
was no contest, in the sense that I made few personal appeals, by canvass, letter, or visit.”199 John 
Robertson Beal observed the leadership race differently. “As Martin’s quiet campaign began to 
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be felt in Toronto,” Beal observed, “the young Mike Pearson fans began to worry that the 
Windsor attorney would get the post by default, since Pearson apparently had no organization at 
work.”200 In response, Pearson and his supporters increased their efforts. Christina McCall noted 
that Walter Gordon organized a bi-partisan dinner to celebrate Pearson’s award of the Nobel 
Prize and began to campaign on his behalf.201 
 “Veteran politician Paul Martin and diplomat Lester B. Pearson,” the Montreal Star 
reported, “have started a pre-convention fight for the Liberal leadership.”202 Both candidates sent 
letters to more than 1,500 Liberal delegates prior to the Convention.203 Nevertheless, Pearson’s 
supporters pointed out to the press that their candidate did not personally like the tactic.204 No 
matter, by actively campaigning, Pearson’s tactics diverged from the gentlemanly notion of the 
leadership race preached by King and practiced by St Laurent at the 1948 Convention -- but he 
managed his maneuvers while evading scrutiny.205 
 Martin matched Pearson’s pursuit of delegates ahead of the convention. The Toronto 
Daily Star reported that Martin actually sent over 2,800 letters to delegates but never once asked 
who they intended to support.206 The letter asked delegates to advise the Essex East MP if he 
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should seek the leadership. The Martin campaign reportedly received between 500 and 600 
replies of encouragement, but the responses did not include firm commitments of support.207 The 
Montreal Star reported that Martin received over 600 pledged delegates.208 Interestingly, the 600 
“pledged delegates” matches the 600 letter replies the Martin campaign claimed to have 
received. 
 Martin’s letter to delegates also spurred controversy between the candidates. Martin’s 
letter said that if he were Prime Minister, Lester Pearson would be returned to the post of 
Secretary of State for External Affairs. “I shall have at my right hand and reappoint to our most 
important cabinet post the greatest minister of external affairs Canada has ever had,” Martin’s 
communiqué boasted.209 Members of the Pearson camp were furious with Martin’s tactic of 
casting Pearson in a role before Martin was leader. Senator David Croll, a former Mayor of 
Windsor, told reporters that Martin had hit below the belt.210 Croll sought to create the 
impression that Martin was fighting the leadership campaign in the trenches, while portraying 
Pearson in an opposite light. The Globe and Mail noted that Pearson made no comments about 
Martin in his letter to delegates.
 Martin called delegates who replied to his letter personally, reportedly making close to 
400 long-distance calls in all.211 The telephone strategy received no complaints from the press or 
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negative comments from Liberals at the time. Nonetheless, some Liberals were offended. Former 
Liberal strategist Keith Davey, a delegate from Eglinton in Toronto, remembers when Paul 
Martin made one of those calls to him a month before the Convention:
Martin phoned me one day that  December and although we had never met, he greeted me 
like a long-lost  friend. First  of all, he wanted to know how the new baby was (not yet 
born, as it happened; Ian Scott Davey arrived on January 4, 1958). Then Martin hoped I 
would not allow the convention to become a feud between St. Michael’s (his college) and 
Victoria (Pearson’s). Needless to say, I firmed my resolution to support Mike Pearson.212
Davey alludes to a level of insincerity from Martin, a greater trend that is quietly noticed in the 
media’s portrayal of the leadership race. Martin’s aggressive strategy at courting delegates 
looked less noble then Pearson’s efforts, even if Pearson wanted to win as much as Martin did.
 Pearson and Martin picked up the pace for campaigning when they arrived at the 1958 
Convention, and both candidates took the time to meet the delegates as they arrived in Ottawa. 
Martin greeted delegates in the lobby of the Chateau Laurier, and Pearson had a notable welcome 
for the Liberal delegates from the West. “Wearing a white 10-gallon cowboy hat and flashing a 
wide grin,” the Winnipeg Free Press observed, “Hon. Lester B. Pearson greeted western 
delegates as they arrived at Union depot here Monday.”213 This was not regular attire for 
Pearson. 
The press cast Pearson as the “available” candidate. Tim Creery of the Montreal Star 
wrote that Pearson “was ready and willing to meet and talk to voting delegates and offer his 
services as leader.”214 In contrast, he reported that Martin was “gunning for the leadership with 
everything he’s got, seeking out every delegate he can find and bringing it bear his formidable 
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powers of persuasion.”215 The Winnipeg Free Press offered a similar contrast: “Mr. Pearson’s 
campaign at the opening day of the convention was played in low key while Mr. Martin was 
campaigning at a high pitch.”216 Once again the theme was Pearson’s casual and reluctant 
attitude versus Martin’s desire to be prime minister. 
 Martin’s leadership campaign was innovative. His team set up a daily campaign 
newspaper, the Liberal Convention Daily. The Montreal Star reported that the newspaper 
“hammers home the idea that Paul Martin is the political fighter who can win at the local riding 
level and in the cut and thrust of parliamentary debate.”217 Creery noted that a copy of the paper 
arrived at 7 a.m. on each of the three days of the Convention, in both English and French, for 
each of the 3,400 delegates.218 The paper mixed straight news and campaign material. “One page 
gives straight news of the convention,” the journalist observed, “while another is unabashed 
propaganda for Martin.”219 Whether Liberal delegates read it is unclear.
 Both Pearson and Martin implemented new tactics while recycling the traditional 
techniques of good conversations and handshakes. This significant change in Liberal Party 
culture led various delegates to complain to reporters. “Many delegates are just a trifle 
bewildered at the tactics used by some workers to influence their vote,” Ben Rose reported. 
“Some delegates wandering around the lobby were downright irritated.”220 McCall noted:
55
215 Ibid.
216 Victor Mackie, “Martin In Catch-Up Bid, Tries To Shuffle Agenda,” Winnipeg Free Press, 14 January 1958.
217 Creery, “Individuality, Stamps Pearson, Martin Drives for Liberal Leadership,” Montreal Star, 14 January 1958.
218 Ibid.
219 Ben Rose, “Battle of the Buttons Rages in Corridors Both Sides Confident,” Toronto Daily Star, 14 January 
1958, page 1.
220 James A. Oaster, “Delegates Met By Pearson, Martin Backers,” Montreal Star, 14 January 1958.
Martin, who had a better record of service to the party as an MP for twenty-three years 
and as a effective minister of national health and welfare, besides an outstanding 
academic background in law and international studies was seen as a ward-heeling pol. He 
wanted power, curious create, and he let people see this base desire.221
By contrast, Pearson demonstrated a show of reluctance, similar to that of St Laurent in 1948.222 
Similarly, Beal asserts that Pearson had already decided that if Liberals wanted him to be the 
next leader of the Party that he would do so.223 The historiography characterizes Martin as 
harbouring an insatiable desire to be Prime Minister and Pearson having the role thrust upon him. 
This factor demonstrates a continuation of the gentlemanly politics of the 1948 Convention that 
saw a reluctant St Laurent defeat the allegedly power-hungry Jimmy Gardiner.
The Beginning of Alternance
 The Kitchener-Waterloo Record wrote in its editorial section on 9 January 1958 that 
religion and race qualifications would not be a factor at the 1958 National Liberal Leadership 
Convention. “Fortunately there seems to be general agreement that religious or racial 
qualifications should have no bearing on the final choice,” it editorialized. “Whether there was a 
tradition against succession of one French-Canadian Catholic by another or not, Canada is now 
an adult nation which needs the best leadership available.224 
 This depiction is contentious. Beal insisted that alternance was a factor at the 1958 
Convention.225  English concluded that Pearson’s election was associated with the principles of 
alternance but not guided by the doctrine itself. Instead, English argued that Pearson’s victory 
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revealed political optics aimed at winning back government. The Liberal Party needed to revert 
to an Anglophone Protestant leader to win back ridings lost to John Diefenbaker’s Progressive 
Conservatives in the 1957 general election. “[J]ournalists quickly claimed that [Paul Martin’s] 
chances were bad,” English argues, “not because he lacked political skills and support but 
because the party had to choose an English Canadian and, preferably a Protestant to recover the 
dozens of seats they had lost in English Protestant bastions in Ontario and the Maritimes.”226 
English associated the 1958 Convention with language and religion. 
 An examination of press coverage clarifies these opposing views on Pearson’s election as 
Liberal leader, supporting English’s conclusions. While alternance had traction in the Canadian 
media, it was not the defining factor at the convention. Nevertheless the election of Pearson 
cemented alternance as doctrine in subsequent Liberal leadership races. In 1968 alternance was 
infused as leadership criteria for Liberal delegates at a time when the election of a francophone 
or anglophone did not aid or dampen electoral strategy. In 1958 the scenario demonstrated that 
the Party was more concerned about winning elections than following tradition. This section 
considers three questions in drawing this conclusion. First it addresses whether alternance was a 
factor in the race according to both Liberals and the Canadian media. Second, it explores why 
Quebec appeared to support Pearson over Martin. Third, the section discusses why the 1958 
Convention cemented alternance as doctrine in future elections for Liberal leadership.
 Walter Gordon remarked in his memoirs that Pearson had the advantage of seeking the 
leadership after nine years of St Laurent in the Prime Minister’s Office. “If the tradition in the 
Liberal Party of switching alternatively from an English-speaking to a French-speaking leader 
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was to be continued,” Gordon posed, “it was the turn this time for an English-speaking Protestant 
to get the nod.”227 In their biography of C.D. Howe, Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn 
assert that Howe believed Pearson’s race and religion put the Liberal Party in better standing to 
win back votes they lost from English-speaking voters. They contend that “Howe partially shared 
Jimmy Gardiner’s perception that the Liberals had lost a lot of ground in 1957 because English-
speaking voters believed that French-Canadian influence was far too great in Ottawa.”228 On top 
of the question of electability, “Howe believed it was not the time to break the Liberal party’s 
tradition of alternating between French and English leaders.”229 The question of ethnicity versus 
electoral success is a reality of Canada’s political system. In comparison to American politics, 
this reality receives little attention in the historiography. But Canadian politicians were just as 
conscious of the pros and cons of various ethnicities, while attempting to win in the political 
arena. 
In an interview with Peter Stursberg, Paul Martin revealed that he knew full-well his race 
and religion would not be favourable in parts of English-speaking Canada:
And the facts of life as he revealed to me when we discussed this thing, particularly in the 
fall of 1957, were that Ontario in particular and the rest of Canada would not  favour as 
successor to St. Laurent someone who was French or part French, and Catholic, and who 
came from Ontario.230
Martin also admitted that, to his and Pearson’s disappointment, alternance was a party principle. 
A young Jean Chrétien, who later challenged alternance himself in the 1984 leadership race, 
agreed with Martin.
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 The Canadian press debated the alternance issue during the Convention. The Globe and 
Mail reported a day before the opening of the Convention that Paul Martin was going head-on 
against the Liberal tradition of alternance:
Mr. Martin’s backers on the other hand, realizing he faces the challenge of tradition that 
alternates the Liberal leadership between an English-speaking Protestant and a French-
speaking Roman Catholic are promoting the argument that  the party can show its political 
maturity by electing the best man regardless of religion.231
The Toronto Daily Star said Martin believed alternance to be a fabricated tradition spread by 
Pearson supporters in Quebec.232 Throughout the press the principle of alternance was suggested 
but it was not receiving any coverage that made Pearson’s victory conclusive. 
 Pearson was able to successfully win the support of delegates in Quebec, who were open 
to transferring the Party leadership to an anglophone. Delegates from that province 
overwhelmingly supported Pearson because Martin seemed to have little to no chance of 
winning, and Jean Lesage, Pearson’s former parliamentary assistant, brought the majority of the 
Quebec delegates over to Pearson’s side. The Chronicle Herald reported that “the Quebec 
delegation, which holds about one-quarter of the voting strength, met in caucus and indicated a 
strong 4-1 backing for [Pearson].”233 Martin was stonewalled by the challenge of having no firm 
identity, noting in his memoirs that “in certain Liberal eyes, I was not regarded in Quebec as a 
true French Canadian; ironically, elsewhere I was not thought of as anything else.”234 Quebec 
delegates admitted gracefully that it was now the turn of an English-speaking Protestant to win 
back government: Pearson.
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 Despite Le Devoir welcoming Pearson’s election as Liberal leader with the headline “La 
loi de l'aternance a triomphe dans les deux groupes ethniques,”235 alternance did no more than 
describe the results. Pearson was elected leader of the Liberal Party because he was the best 
chance for the Liberals to defeat John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives. Although it was 
followed, tradition was not the driving force behind Pearson’s victory as it would be for Trudeau 
in 1968. 
For the Good of the Party and Each Other
 The circumstances in 1958 were significantly different for the Liberal Party than they 
were in 1958. Nonetheless, King’s Liberal Party was fresh from re-election while St Laurent’s 
was just defeated. Unlike King, St Laurent did not intervene in the race for his successor. There 
is no discussion in the historiography, memoirs or media reports about rules or any sort of 
parameters St Laurent put in place to influence the outcome. St Laurent was withdrawn and 
provided little oversight. The party survived the contest because of Pearson and Martin’s passion 
for the Liberal Party. 
 Martin made the choice of Pearson unanimous at the end of the 1958 Convention. “We 
had ‘stood side by side in parliament and abroad in the United Nations, and we will stand 
together again,” Martin said to the delegates.236 Pearson and Martin enhanced their friendship 
through mutual respect and goals. “[Martin] was naturally disappointed,” Pearson wrote in his 
memoirs, “and I could not help but share some of his disappointment because I knew how he 
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felt, and he was a friend.”237 Although it was not a seamless transition, Pearson sought to work 
effectively with Martin. “He was also a trouper in the political arena,” Pearson stated, “and 
became my right-hand man, the indispensable party tactician in the House of Commons.”238 
Pearson appointed Martin the Secretary of State for External Affairs when the Liberals formed 
the government in 1963, giving Martin the posting he always wanted. Martin’s son, Paul Martin 
Jr., remembers Pearson’s friendship with his father fondly. “For his part, once he became leader, 
Mr. Pearson continued to treat my father with the utmost respect and friendship, and my father 
was happy to reciprocate.”239 
Martin remained a source of encouragement for Pearson. On 31 March 1958 when it 
became clear Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives had won the largest majority government 
in Canadian history up to that time, Martin spoke with Pearson on the phone. “After my victory 
parade around the riding, I spoke to him on the phone about midnight,” Martin recounted. 
Pearson “was downcast. Blaming himself, he rashly suggested that he ought to stand down as 
leader. I firmly discouraged him. It was not the last time he was to discuss such a course with 
me.”240 Martin’s memoir, like any other, is to a degree, self serving. However his choice to 
support Pearson in an hour of failure is commendable. A lesser man motivated purely by self-
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 “I’ll let you in on a little secret,” Martin told the delegates, “I voted for Mike.” The 
convention delegates applauded as Martin moved to make the leadership vote unanimous. “And 
I’ll let you in on another secret. Mike voted for me.”241 Louis St Laurent was relieved of his 
duties as leader of the Liberal Party and Lester Pearson became the new leader of the Official 
Opposition. Martin was on side, giving full support to Pearson and the party. The 1958 National 
Liberal Leadership Convention closed with the singing of “O’Canada” and “God Save the 
Queen.”242
 There was consensus within the Canadian media that Lester Pearson had been the front-
runner in the Liberal leadership race before the delegates even arrived in Ottawa. As a result of 
Pearson’s projected victory, Paul Martin assumed the role of underdog in the race, a label he 
readily accepted and worked into his stump speeches. It was also a statement of fact.  Delegates 
from every province supported Pearson in an overwhelming margin.
 The 1958 Convention also included media reports on Maryon Pearson and Eleanor 
Martin. Depictions of the candidates’ wives were used to portray the different personalities and 
interests of Lester Pearson and Paul Martin. The coverage of Mrs. Pearson and Mrs. Martin also 
reflected a transition in the discussion of party leadership towards personality, and away from the 
traditional discussion of where the Liberals would go under new political leadership.
 The 1958 Convention saw both traditional and new leadership campaign tactics. Pearson 
wanted the leadership as much as Martin, and he campaigned hard to win it. The core difference 
between the two was their portrayal in the media. Journalists depicted Pearson as the reluctant 
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candidate who had the office thrust upon him, while depicting Martin as the candidate who 
craved the leadership and would do just about anything to win it.
 Alternance became a part of Liberal Party doctrine at the conclusion of the 1958 
Convention. With the selection of Pearson, Liberals had alternated between French and English 
leaders four consecutive times over seven decades. After gracefully handing the Liberal Party 
reigns to an English Canadian in 1958, Quebec Liberals would expect the act to be reciprocated. 
The election of Pearson as party leader is partially explained by the geographical makeup of 
Liberal strength following their loss in the 1957 general election. As English remarked, the 
Liberals needed an English-speaking, preferably Protestant, leader to win back lost seats in the 
English-speaking, Protestant areas of Ontario and the Maritimes.  
 The passion both Pearson and Martin shared for the Liberal Party surmounted their desire 
to lead it. Both contenders put the organization before their ambitions. Pearson recognized 
Martin’s value with the party and exploited his talents after 1957. Martin could have resisted 
Pearson’s victory and divided the Liberal Party into separate factions, but he did not. In the end 
Pearson and Martin remained committed to their common cause, working together for the good 
of the party and the country. 
 Pearson’s victory also adheres to what Courtney says is the dominating influence of the 
parliamentary caucus at leadership conventions. The convention gave Pearson an overwhelming 
endorsement and there is evidence that it was spread all across the country, including Quebec. 
The influence of key Liberals such as Howe, Sinclair, Pickersgill and Lesage proved invaluable 
to Pearson’s victory.
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 During Pearson’s tenure as Liberal leader, the caucus redefined who was and was not a 
Liberal. The ambition of aspiring leadership candidates to take over the reins from Pearson 
usurped the kind of devotion that Pearson and Martin had for the Liberal Party. The next time 
Liberals met to select a leader it produced the most advanced, competitive, fierce and bitter 
National Liberal Leadership Convention to that time.
 1958 was the last time a runner-up left a Liberal leadership convention articulating 
complete support and loyalty for his victorious opponent. In turn, Pearson, the new leader, 
extended an olive branch of friendship and respect to his opponent. These two men had every 




 THE BEGINNING OF THE LEADERSHIP WARS: THE 1968 NATIONAL LIBERAL 
LEADERSHIP CONVENTION
I’m going to do something which is not usual. I’m going to congratulate the losers in 
this contest for the fight that they  put up. Perhaps I may  be pardoned if I single out 
one who was fighting the battles of liberalism, security  and freedom in parliament 
before some who are here as delegates today were born. Paul Martin, who battled 
in this campaign from the beginning and who withdrew with gallantry and chivalry.
  -- SNIPSforCanada, “1968 Liberal Convention - Pearson Retires, 
Hands Government to Trudeau.”243
 The 1968 National Liberal Leadership Convention concluded with Lester B. Pearson’s 
remarks. Although it was customary for the retiring leader to close the conventions, Pearson’s 
words symbolize a camaraderie the Liberal Party would spend years trying to recapture.
  “Who said Canadian politics are dull?” the Chronicle Herald asked rhetorically in April 
1968.244 For the first time since 1919 the Liberal leadership vote moved beyond the first ballot 
and culminated in a razor-thin victory for Pierre Elliott Trudeau on the fourth. Unlike previous 
Liberal leadership conventions, this one did not meet to discuss policy resolutions. Its sole 
purpose was the election of a new leader. It convened from 4-6 April 1968 at the new Ottawa 
Civic Centre in midtown Landsdowne Park,245 with a field of experienced and well-qualified 
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candidates:  Trudeau, Paul Martin, Robert Winters,246 Paul Hellyer,247 John Turner,248 Joe 
Greene,249 Allan MacEachen,250 Eric Kierens,251 and Mitchell Sharp.252 (Reverend Lloyd 
Henderson once again ran an inconsequential campaign.) The number of quality contenders and 
the tactics they utilized to win represented a serious change from the 1948 and 1958 
Conventions. 
 The 1968 Convention was the first multi-ballot leadership race in the Liberal Party since 
1919. Sullivan says that at the convention’s outset, Trudeau’s campaign team detected a surge of 
support for both Turner and Winters.253 Nevertheless, Trudeau was aided by Sharp who dropped 
out of the race and endorsed Trudeau before proceedings began. English writes that Hellyer’s 
speech to the Convention cost him delegate support.254 After the third ballot Green dropped out 
and supported Trudeau, Hellyer dropped out and supported Winters, while Turner refused to 
leave the race. On the fourth and final ballot, Trudeau won the Liberal leadership with 1,203 
votes or 50.8 per cent of the vote, compared to Winters’s 954 or 40.3 per cent, and Turner’s 195 
or 8.2 per cent.
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 This analysis of the 1968 convention focuses on the proceedings, media coverage and the 
experience of participants, detailing the public assessments “in real time.” It is supported by 
range of primary materials such as memoirs, newspaper and magazine sources in both French 
and English, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio and television archives, as well as 
archival materials. It also builds upon the historiography of the convention, which includes a 
plethora of biographic works focusing on Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the eventual winner, as well as 
Pearson, John Turner, Jean Chrétien, and Eric Kierans. Other works focus entirely on the Liberal 
Party such as Martin Sullivan’s Mandate 68, Joseph Wearing’s The L-Shaped Party, Christina 
McCall’s Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party and Stephen Clarkson’s The Big Red 
Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics, as well as general histories of the 
period such as Peter Newman’s The Distemper of Our Times: Canadian Politics in Transition, 
1963-1968. These studies offer both a broad and detailed understanding of the 1968 Convention, 
disputing both facts and motivations of the candidate. Debate surrounding Trudeau’s interest in 
the Liberal leadership prior to his declaration is explored in significant detail.
 The days of prominent Liberals putting the good of the Liberal Party ahead of their own 
political ambitions were gone. The ability for serious leadership contenders to step aside 
gracefully without long-lasting resentment, as Jimmy Gardiner and Paul Martin had done, proved 
difficult. The lines drawn between leadership candidates posed a far greater threat to the unity of 
the Liberal Party, spawning opposing Liberal factions that would remain long after the leader 
was selected.
 This chapter explores six dominant themes. The first section associates Trudeau’s 
successful candidacy with the doctrine of alternance. The second explores the inability of the 
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media and pundits to guess with near-assurance the winner of the leadership race. The third 
focuses on campaign tactics, the intensity of the race, and how stakes were defined. The fourth 
assesses speculation about backroom deals, comparing media coverage with archival documents 
and memoirs. The fifth section explores the explosive debates and intra-party disputes over the 
Liberal Party’s policy towards national unity with specific emphasis on Quebec. It addresses the 
importance of the debate among the candidates as well as the carelessness many leadership 
candidates employed to try to benefit from the issue. The sixth section explores the narrative of 
the balloting, describing how tensions came to a head with some Liberals opting to quietly step 
out of the race while others refused to let go of their leadership ambitions.
Francophone or Anglophone? Alternance and the 1968 Convention
 By the time of the 1968 Convention, alternance had become an indoctrinated component 
of Liberal leadership criteria. After Pearson’s announced resignation, the media considered Paul 
Martin, the only French-speaking candidate known to be in the race, the front-runner. Martin’s 
status was far less certain after the entry of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Alternance was not a factor in 
the media’s presentation of the 1968 Convention to Canadians, but it was an internal factor in the 
leadership race. This section considers two patterns associated with alternance. First, it addresses 
the low level of notoriety alternance received in the Canadian press. Second, it emphasizes the 
importance of alternance among active Liberals.
 On 29 March 1968 the Kitchener-Waterloo Record’s Ben Ward reported that alternance, if 
followed, meant the next Liberal leader would be Martin or Trudeau.255 Alternance, however, 
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received no other significant media coverage – even though influential Liberals recognized the 
principle.  For example, the retiring Pearson believed that his successor should be a Francophone 
and the former diplomat spoke candidly on that conviction, even though he refused to publicly 
support a particular candidate. Pearson remarked in his memoirs that “[t]his was the tradition of 
our party; this had been our advantage through the years in a party political sense over the 
Conservative party: we could always find good men to lead our party in Quebec, and they never 
could.”256 Jack Cahill alleges that Pearson met with Marchand and Trudeau on the evening of his 
resignation about alternance: finding a strong French-Canadian candidate to succeed him.257 
In Mandate ‘68 Sullivan asserts that Pearson wanted Trudeau to succeed him all along, 
contending that Pearson subtly discouraged Marchand from running in hopes of getting him to 
support a Trudeau candidacy with his influence in Quebec.258 Radwanski, English and Litt all 
dispute Sullivan’s assertion. Radwanski observes that Pearson gave Marchand time to consider 
the offer and approached Trudeau once Marchand decided not to run for leader: “In mid-January, 
after Trudeau had returned from a two-week holiday in Tahiti... Pearson called him and 
Marchand into his office, stressed to him that Marchand had definitely decided not to run, and 
told him that he was the only possible French candidate.”259 English notes that Pearson was 
worried about Martin’s candidacy and wanted Marchand to be the Quebec candidate: “Pearson 
hoped for a strong Quebec candidate -- Marchand was his favourite--and he worried about Paul 
Martin Sr., the external affairs minister, who he believed belonged too much to the Liberal past at 
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a time when new voices were essential.”260 Similarly, Litt asserts that only after Marchand 
declined to run did Trudeau become the logical candidate from Quebec.261
 Other prominent Liberals also sought a French-Canadian Party leader. Walter Gordon 
contends in his memoirs that Jean Marchand, Trudeau, and himself among others, wanted a 
French-Canadian to succeed Pearson.262 As well, Judy LaMarsh asserts in her memoirs that she 
thought it likely the Liberal Party would continue its tradition and select a French-Canadian 
leader.263 Even Paul Martin was open to embracing alternance in 1968. Former Liberal MP 
Eugene Whelan asserts that Martin suggested to him that if he were elected leader, the principle 
of alternance would be continued in the Liberal Party.264 Martin’s changed position on alternance 
demonstrates that it was a factor for members of the Liberal Party. Moreover it demonstrates 
Martin’s willingness to change his position on the issue in order to capitalize on it. Others, such 
as Chrétien, opposed the doctrine of alternance and openly supported Sharp.265
 Given the doctrine of alternance, Martin was considered the man to beat in the weeks 
following Pearson’s resignation. Alternance also explains the meteoric rise of the campaign to 
elect Trudeau after he entered the race in February 1968. The preference for Trudeau over Martin 
also speaks to Martin’s dual cultural identity. Although a Francophone’s victory was far from 
assured, their immediate rise in the polls suggests they both embodied qualities to which 
delegates were immediately drawn. The prevalence with which alternance is discussed in the 
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memoirs of Liberals, especially the strong feelings embodied by the outgoing Prime Minister, 
qualifies the doctrine as a substantial factor. The importance of the Quebec issue made it 
essential for a Francophone victory in order to ensure credibility in the province. 
No Definitive Choice
 The 1968 Convention was neck and neck race for the Liberal leadership between a field 
of solid contenders. In popular historical discourse Pierre Trudeau is often associated with an 
exciting performance surrounded by an aura of “Trudeaumania” against which no political 
opponent could compete. Although Trudeau stood in front of the pack of the 1968 leadership 
race, his ability to win the contest was far from certain. The race was too complex to predict. 
Trudeau’s opponents perceived him as a legitimate contender, but still believed they could win. 
Furthermore, an examination of media reports swirling around the 1968 Convention 
demonstrates that Trudeau’s leadership campaign lacked the feeling of certain victory associated 
with the campaigns of St Laurent in 1948 and Pearson in 1958. 
 Nevertheless, Trudeau’s entrance into the 1968 leadership campaign changed the outlook 
of the race. An early poll conducted at the end of January 1968, before Trudeau’s official 
announcement, gave him just 2 per cent support nationally among Canadian voters.266 In a poll 
conducted over the second and third week of March 1968, Trudeau’s support had risen to 26 per 
cent.267 In their memoirs, Kierans, Chrétien, Martin Jr., and Davey document Trudeau’s impact 
on the race. Kierans suggested that Trudeau’s victory was pre-destined.  Others emphasize how 
difficult his path to victory really was.
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 Kierans remembers the 1968 Convention as a coronation of sorts for Trudeau. “I was the 
first one into the race,” Kierans writes, “which turned out in the end to be no race at all, but a 
waltz to coronation for Pierre Elliott Trudeau, then federal minister of justice as well as the 
leader of the Three Wise Men from Quebec.”268 Kierans’s status as a Liberal outsider affected his 
standing in the leadership race. Peter C. Newman notes that Kierans set out to meet all 2,500 
Liberal delegates across the country. He faced an uphill contest because of his relative obscurity 
within the Liberal Party outside of Quebec.269 Consequently, Kierans is nearly alone in 
addressing Trudeau as the certain victor. 
 The Trudeau campaign gained a surge of momentum. “Even by March it had become 
clear that Trudeau was the man to beat,” Pearson reminisces, “and that this could be done only if 
all the anti-Trudeau forces united behind one candidate. This they did not and could not do, right 
up until the last ballot on Saturday.”270 Martin Jr. compares the rise of Trudeau with the fall of 
Martin, the original front-runner. “It was about a change of generations; it was about sweeping 
out the old with the charisma of the new,” he remembered. “Suddenly, all my father’s advantages 
- his seniority, his experience, his diligent working of the party over decades - were 
disadvantages, as Liberals were mesmerized with the novelty and promise of Trudeau’s 
candidacy.”271 Chrétien echoed Martin Jr.‘s interpretations and credits Sharp’s endorsement as 
significant for Trudeau. “In the end, Sharp’s move was an important factor in Trudeau’s victory,” 
Chrétien explained, “because the race against Winters was close, and Trudeau was helped by 
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being seen to have momentum.”272  Chrétien’s memory of the 1968 Convention is a far more 
accurate analysis. Although Trudeau was running a successful campaign going into the 
Convention, victory was far from certain. Last minute momentum was essential.
 Reporter Michael Cassidy suggested the race was tight as the Convention drew near. “A 
month ago most observers here thought a Trudeau win was inevitable,” said Cassidy. “Now, 
though Trudeau is still conceded the first ballot lead, there is no consensus on who will win or 
where they will draw second-choice support to put them over the top.”273 Most media reports 
viewed Trudeau as a serious leadership contender but not the certain victor. The media’s analysis 
and predictions lacked the near certainty with which they had covered both the 1948 and 1958 
Conventions. The coverage included opinion polls of Canadian voters, and reports indicating that 
half of the Liberal delegates did not support a particular leadership candidate prior to the opening 
of the Convention.
  The media’s predictions ahead of the convention were consistent: Trudeau will win the 
first ballot but the election is anyone’s to win. However, Hellyer’s emergence as a serious 
challenger to Trudeau was becoming apparent, surging past Martin’s expectations in the press. 
On 1 April 1968 the Financial Times reported that they believed Trudeau had the potential to 
continually build support on each ballot until he eventually would win the Liberal leadership.274 
This scenario, although predicted in other media reports, demonstrates the difficult nature of a 
Trudeau victory at the 1968 Convention.  The Kitchener-Waterloo Record reported on 3 April 
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1968 that the potential winners could be narrowed down to five.275 On 4 April 1967 the Montreal 
Star reported that Hellyer was turning into a serious contender. “The race for the Liberal 
leadership showed every sign of developing into a tight Trudeau-Hellyer battle as the party 
convention got under way today.”276  Similarly, the Winnipeg Free Press reported that Hellyer 
stood the best chance to stop Trudeau.277 Hellyer, however, lacked the ability to manage large 
groups of delegates.278 Accordingly, no one in the media could credibly predict who would win 
on a multiple ballot vote. In reality the media had just as little indication of who would survive 
beyond the first ballot as they knew where the free delegates would go. A report from S.A. 
Williams Consulting informed the Hellyer campaign that the leadership race was a contest 
among Trudeau, Martin, Hellyer and Sharp in no particular order or rank.279 Williams predicted 
that there would be six ballots and either Trudeau, Martin or Hellyer would be successful. 
Although the memo provided no strategic benefit, it corroborates the uncertainty portrayed in the 
media reports. 
 Media reports also predicted Trudeau would win a majority of delegates from major 
urban centres. The Montreal Star and the Toronto Daily Star both presented findings from a 
Gallup Poll targeting Canadian voters and not Liberal delegates. In the poll voters were not given 
names to select but instead were requested to select them on their own. Trudeau was selected 32 
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per cent of the time followed by Martin 14 per cent of the time.280 There is a clear absence of 
information backing up the intentions of Liberal delegates. At this point in the race the intentions 
of voters were a secondary factor far removed from the concerns of Liberal delegates looking for 
the leader that could best represent “their” Liberal Party.
  Prior to the opening of the 1968 Convention reports began to surface suggesting that a 
large number delegates were not committed to any of the leadership candidates. The Financial 
Times reported on 1 April 1968 that half the delegates were uncommitted while reports in the 
Montreal Star suggested that a third of the delegates were uncommitted.281 A 28 March report 
from the Hellyer campaign suggested that 910 delegates remained uncommitted going into the 
convention.282 The Hellyer team also remained confident about their Toronto delegates. They 
estimated that they had 60 of the 183 delegates, to Trudeau’s 36, Winters 28, Sharp’s 16, Turner’s 
11, MacEachen’s 2, and Greene’s 1, with the remaining 29 undecided or unknown.283 Of course 
some delegates were uncomfortable publicizing their leadership choice. The opportunity to 
attend various campaign hospitality suites, breakfasts or other events also gave delegates a vested 
interest in remaining neutral. Reports in the Kitchener-Waterloo Record even suggested that 
some delegates had promised their vote to multiple campaigns.284 The prospect of multiple 
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ballots, with second, third, and even fourth preferences for delegates, complicated matters even 
further.
 In his biography of Trudeau, historian John English remarks that “[Trudeau] ran for office 
among the finest group of politicians ever to contest a party leadership in Canada, and he stood 
out above them all.”285 The Liberal political heavyweights sought the top job, including Robert 
Winters, another fiscally-conservative Liberal who joined the race late in March. Journalists Jack 
Cahill and Martin Lawrence suggested that Winters immediately took away support from the 
other leadership candidates,286 in particular Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp who had enjoyed 
the support of the business community.287 Sharp was considered a serious candidate for the 
leadership until the failure of his tax bill almost caused a snap election. Pearson’s efforts were 
able to stem the opposition from bringing down the government but Sharp’s reputation was 
tarnished significantly. Nevertheless, Winters was unable to capture enough of the delegates to 
win the leadership. Newman argues that Winters’s hesitancy to enter the race until early March, 
well after his opponents, cost him the leadership. Consequently, Winters was well behind in the 
race to capture delegates who had decided to support other candidates after Winters initially said 
that he did not intend to run.288 In the end, Winters managed to finish second after just one month 
of active campaigning.
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 Before the candidacy of Pierre Trudeau was confirmed it looked as though Paul Martin 
would finally become leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister of Canada. Newman notes 
that Martin had considerable amounts of money to spend, delegate support across Canada, and 
was leading in both private and public opinion polls immediately following Pearson’s 
resignation.289 In the end, it was not to be. Martin’s dual cultural identity continued to serve as a 
barrier to his leadership prospects. Pearson did not regard Martin as a francophone and believed 
Liberals felt the same.290 Both Cahill and English suggest that when Trudeau entered the race 
Martin’s chances ended.291 Regardless, public opinion polls presented in March (but taken in 
early February) had Martin in the lead with Trudeau (undeclared at the time of the polls) in a 
close second.292
 The last serious contender was a young John Turner. Newman notes that the leadership 
race allowed Turner to come of age.293 Nevertheless, biographer Paul Litt notes that Turner could 
not move past the Trudeau campaign in the weeks leading up to the convention.294 Turner’s 
campaign message of youth and rejuvenation was drowned out and absorbed by the Trudeau 
campaign.295 Although Turner retained much of his base support during the convention, his 
potential for growth was severely limited by Trudeau. Young Liberals remained vibrant Turner 
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supporters. “Turner retained the support of most Young Liberals,” Litt observes, “because they 
had already committed to him, but his potential for growth was gravely curtailed.”296 
 Trudeau entered the leadership race in February after serious deliberation. Trudeau’s 
decision believed that Jean Marchand should have been the francophone candidate,297 but 
Marchand recognized that his English was not strong enough and suggested to Pearson that 
Trudeau seek the job. Pearson agreed. Martin Sullivan, George Radwanksi, Christina McCall, 
and John English all assert that Trudeau was hesitant to run for the leadership,298 and that his 
long delay in committing himself as a candidate had to do with his legislative agenda as Minister 
of Justice. Trudeau believed that if he were a formal candidate, his controversial amendments to 
the criminal code and his constitutional negotiations with the provinces would be regarded as 
disingenuous.299 Nevertheless, Trudeau’s closest friends ensured that Trudeau was in good 
standing for a leadership race. Marc Lalonde convinced Pearson to send Trudeau on a cross-
Canada tour to meet with the provincial premiers in advance of the federal-provincial 
constitutional conference.300 Trudeau’s popularity among Liberals and voters only rose as he 
refused to commit himself to the leadership.
 Trudeau was elected Liberal Party leader after four ballots. Although many public 
opinion polls demonstrated that the general public viewed Trudeau favourably, his support 
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among Liberals was never certain. Even on the fourth ballot Trudeau’s margin of victory over his 
opponents Winters and Turner was thin. The race was too complex to predict with certainty, as 
some delegates refused to commit themselves and others ended up voting for their fourth choice 
on the fourth ballot. Trudeau’s popularity with the general public may have allowed him to 
charge admission to his public events, but the average Liberal was divided over who should 
replace Pearson.301 Trudeau’s campaign lacked the definitive victory that past Liberal leaders, 
such as Mackenzie King, believed to be so important. Ultimately, persistent divisions within the 
Liberal Party developed at the 1968 Convention and threatened intra-party unity.
How to Win: Convention Tactics
 In 1968 contenders used a pool of new techniques that made the campaign a vicious five 
month process, and offered insight into the growing complexity of Liberal leadership contests. 
This complexity enhanced personal tension between the candidates. This section examines the 
convention itself, focusing on the techniques used in the final days of the leadership race. The 
techniques used to court Liberal delegates at the convention included candidate events, 
publications and campaign materials, floor demonstrations, and even dirty tricks. The tactics 
utilized at the 1968 convention inspired division and challenged notions of gentlemanly 
competition the Liberal Party had endured for multiple decades. The race for the Liberal 
leadership flared personal tensions between the candidates.
 Each leadership candidate operated hospitality suites where delegates were invited to 
share free food and drink. According to the Chronicle Herald, twenty hospitality suites were 
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open in the major downtown Ottawa hotels,302 paid for by the leadership candidates’ campaigns. 
In his memoirs Kierans notes that Trudeau had eight hospitality suites but neglects to mention his 
own.303 Kierans’s campaign actually operated five: two at the Chateau Laurier, and one at each of 
the Beacon Arms Hotel, Skyline Hotel and the Bruce Macdonald Motor Hotel.304 Each 
hospitality suite had a direct phone line to the Kierans campaign headquarters at the Beacon 
Arms Hotel and could be used by any delegate.305 Kierans’s hospitality suites were instructed to 
keep alcohol service to a minimum by only serving during specific cocktail hours. At all other 
times the suites would serve coffee and croissants.306 Furthermore, Kierans’s campaign provided 
entertainment for delegates during reception hours.307 
Some hospitality suites were more fun the others. The Kitchener-Waterloo Record 
reported that Turner’s hospitality suites were fun, while Trudeau’s were purely political and a 
source of pure excitement. The report claimed that because Trudeau’s events were packed with 
delegates wanting to meet the prospective leader, the atmosphere was almost overwhelming.308 
The events allowed Liberals to socialize and to a degree, reward committed delegates for their 
support. Candidates sought to meet delegates and gain or keep their support. For example, a 
report in the Globe and Mail highlights the fast-paced nature of campaigning in the Martin 
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suites. “Mr. Martin bounced into his reception like a man without a care in the world,” John 
Dafoe reported. “He shook hands all around the room and then stood in the middle as the band 
played his campaign song, “Martin’s the Man,” and placard-bearing teenagers danced around 
him.”309 
 Leadership candidates communicated with both the media and Liberal delegates. They 
issued press releases to the 1,386 media representatives present at the Convention and littered the 
delegates with promotional materials such as brochures, buttons or sponsored newspapers.310 For 
example, the Hellyer campaign released the Liberal Convention News to delegates prior to and 
during the Convention.311 Similarly, the Kierans campaign released the Kierans’ Canada 
publication for Liberal delegates.312 In addition each candidate had an information booth where 
delegates could find campaign materials and ask questions.313 All told, Liberal delegates were 
given more personal attention than ever before from the leadership contenders. The 1958 contest 
that had revolved around finding ways to improve the handshake game of politics had evolved 
into a full-fledged, modern election of its own. The aggressive campaigning that took place only 
intensified the race, raised the stakes, and further divided Liberals over the candidates they 
preferred and the candidates they refused to support. 
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 The Candidates’ Liaison Committee meetings agreed that each leadership candidate 
would be allowed to utilize floor demonstrations at the Convention in addition to the candidates’ 
speeches on 5 April 1968. All bands, signs, banners and other materials had to be removed from 
the Convention floor by the end of the demonstration. Staff was on hand to ensure 
demonstrations did not disrupt the speech or demonstration of another candidate.314 Radwanski 
notes that, unlike his opponents, Trudeau believed that his campaign’s demonstration should be 
spontaneous and vetoed plans to include marching girls or a band. The plan paid off:
That combination of sang-froid and theatrical instinct paid of handsomely: When the 
justice minister was called to the microphone Friday night, the Ottawa Civic Centre hall 
came electrifyingly alive with a great  whoop of ‘Trudeau!’ from the audience and a 
sudden forest of Trudeau placards.315
The point of demonstrations was to show the national press and unfriendly Liberal delegates that 
their candidate had the momentum to win. 
 The media also reported dirty tricks perpetrated by the leadership hopefuls and their 
campaign teams. For example, the Trudeau campaign alleged that Martin’s team waged a mail-
order smear campaign against Trudeau. ”Most, if not all, of the Liberal party delegates who 
begin Thursday to choose a new party leader and prime minister of Canada,” Ron Haggart 
reported, “have received mailed literature originating with the so-called Canadian Intelligence 
Service, operated by Ron Gostick of Flesherton, Ont.”316 An official from the Martin campaign 
denied the allegation. “We deplore this,” Duncan Edmonds, campaign manager for Paul Martin 
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said. “We have not done this. Our mailing list was not used with our authority.”317 The allegation 
itself indicated the cultural war brewing over the Party leadership. Another report in the 
Kitchener-Waterloo Record alleged that telephone lines were bugged but failed to provide any 
substantiating evidence. The report also alleged that Trudeau’s telephone lines were cut between 
his campaign headquarters and his office at the Chateau Laurier, and the Trudeau campaign 
wired all of their Convention floor stations with Bell telephone lines in fear that other candidates 
would jam walkie-talkie signals.318 None of the memoirs or archival records corroborates these 
claims.
 The age of winning delegates over in the days prior to convention voting was over. 
Raised stakes meant that candidates brought their message to the delegates’ doorsteps. The 
Convention itself had become an exercise in spreading messages the candidates had been 
pushing since January. The high stakes meant victory was the only goal for the contenders. Some 
candidates, or their supporters, would do so at just about any cost.
Liberals in the Smoke-filled Back Rooms
 The large number of qualified candidates meant the majority would be forced to concede 
defeat and drop out of the balloting. Consequently the 1968 convention provided a more intense 
backdrop for Mackenzie King’s strategy before and during the 1948 convention: the back room 
deal. The Toronto Daily Star reported that the 1968 event forced the collision of two worlds. The 
first was the public world: what reporters and camera crews recorded for the general public. The 
second world is a far more secretive one: “the covert world of guarded corridors, locked doors, 
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whispered telephone calls and secret deals.”319 The aura of this second world was described like 
a scene from a movie. According to journalist Val Sears, “the concrete corridors and paperboard 
rooms of thus smoky, backroom community may be where the real political action is.”320
 The Hellyer campaign targeted Eric Kierans as a potential ally. Hellyer’s team believed 
they could acquire Kierans’s support (and that of many of his delegates) after he dropped from 
the race.321 They believed that Kierans would also give Hellyer additional credibility in Quebec 
and more support from youth delegates.322 In exchange, they would probably offer Kierans a 
Cabinet post, such as Trade and Commerce.323 As well, the Hellyer campaign realized that such a 
maneuver would elicit a potentially negative response from another candidate or from Kierans 
himself.324 Media reports and memoirs suggest that a potential deal never became public 
knowledge; after all, Kierans withdrew and refused to openly declare his support for another 
candidate.
 Sharp withdrew from the race and supported Trudeau. On 3 April 1968, headlines, such 
as Le Devoir’s “On prête à Mitchell Sharp l'intention de se retirer et d'appuyer Trudeau,” 
appeared in newspapers across the country. Chrétien revealed that Sharp’s campaign hired a 
polling firm and determined that their support was too modest to make a serious attempt at the 
leadership. So Sharp became the first candidate to drop out of the race and endorse one of his 
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former opponents.325 The next day Turner stood in front of reporters and decried Sharp’s 
withdrawal as a back room deal.326 “This convention has to be fought on the floor,” Turner told 
reporters, promising that his campaign would make no deals or arrangements.327 Turner also 
criticized Joey Smallwood’s endorsement of Trudeau, alleging that these arrangements 
threatened the democratic nature of the convention.328 Martin Jr. recalls that Turner was 
furious.329 
It is not clear that Sharp and Trudeau made any formal deal.330 The historiography 
suggests that Sharp’s endorsement of Trudeau brought legitimacy to the Justice Minister’s 
popular but uncertain campaign. Sullivan, Cahill, and Jamie Swift assert that Sharp’s 
endorsement indeed legitimized Trudeau’s candidacy in the minds of undecided Liberals.331 
Although Sharp’s leadership candidacy had been threatened by his parliamentary failure, his 
endorsement brought the party establishment onside with Trudeau’s candidacy. Early reports also 
indicated that Alan MacEachen was preparing to move to Trudeau in the event of a poor showing 
early in the balloting.332
 The media disseminated rumours of an anti-Trudeau movement forming during the 
Convention. The Globe and Mail reported that such a movement would require a clear runner-up 
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to Trudeau to emerge on either the first or second ballot: “For example, Mr. Martin runs second, 
ahead of Mr. Hellyer, he would reasonably expect Mr. Hellyer to cast his lot with him. The 
reverse would apply if Mr. Hellyer ran ahead of Mr. Martin.”333 On 4 April 1968 reports began to 
circulate that the Martin campaign was keeping in touch with the Winters campaign about a stop-
Trudeau movement.334 The Globe and Mail reported on 5 April 1968 that the two teams had met 
but were unable to come to terms.335 Martin corroborated this report in his memoirs.336 Similarly 
Agriculture Minister Joe Greene told the Toronto Daily Star that he was being offered deals by 
other candidates but refused to give names.337 Finally, the Toronto Daily Star broke a story 
suggesting a deal could not be reached to stop Trudeau: “Representatives of other major 
leadership candidates met late into the night and again this morning in an unsuccessful attempt to 
form an effective coalition to stop him.”338 Clearly, some leadership contenders were unwilling 
to conceded victory to Trudeau, unable to push aside their ambition for the good of the Liberal 
Party.
 The back room deal was the most compelling story in the press during the 1968 
Convention. The speculation that for the first time since 1919 the Liberal Party leadership race 
would exceed the first ballot brought about back room politicking – and deep divisions within 
the party. The media’s fascination with the stop-Trudeau movement reflected murmurs coming 
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out of various leadership campaigns. As candidates dropped off the balloting and crossed the 
floor, Liberal Party division was unavoidable.
Liberal Party Unity and National Unity
 The most compelling policy debate that occurred during the race to succeed Pearson was 
over Quebec: how the federal government could combat the rising tide of separatism in the 
province. McCall, English, Radwanski, and Litt assert that Trudeau’s performance at the Federal-
Provincial Constitutional Conference in February 1968 cemented his candidacy in the eyes of 
Canadians and won him significant support in his leadership bid.339 Trudeau’s views on federal-
provincial relations were the official views of the Pearson Government. Consequently when 
Trudeau’s leadership opponents questioned his approach to federal-provincial relations they also 
undermined party unity. By openly criticizing Trudeau’s position they were also criticizing the 
prime minister they sought to replace. 
 Trudeau believed federalism was the Canadian way, and that no province deserved 
preferential treatment over another. Days before the opening of the 1968 convention, Trudeau 
delivered another speech on federalism with specific attention on the status of Quebec. “I would 
like to say first that in my view, federalism is not an expediency, not a compromise and even less 
a last resort,” the Montreal Star reported him stating. “On the contrary, it is an avant-garde 
political formula that I would endorse even outside the Canadian context.”340 Trudeau believed it 
was necessary for both sides of the argument to have clearly stated positions. In his view, two 
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options existed: the first held that Quebec and Canada are incompatible; the second insisted on 
the need to trust federalism to take its course.341 In his speech to the Convention on 5 April 1968 
Trudeau focused on his perceptions of federalism:
For many years, I have been writing and speaking in favour of a strong and clearly 
defined federalism. In the years after the war when many politicians and political writers 
were advocating the centralization of powers in Ottawa, I was urging the Province to 
exercise their responsibilities.
In recent  years when some have demanded the transfer of essential powers from the 
Federal Government to one or more provinces, I have pointed out that this could destroy 
our federal system.
I have always maintained that our present constitution could be improved. In fact, I have 
recommended many revisions, such as a Charter of Human Rights, and changes in the 
Senate and the Supreme Court. I would agree to any transfer of jurisdiction which would 
allow us to be better and more efficiently governed. In my experience, what  interests 
Canadians is good federal government and good provincial governments.342
As such Trudeau defined his views on federalism with clarity and challenged his opponents in 
the Liberal Party leadership race to do so as well. Moreover, Trudeau was encouraging a 
confrontational approach between the federal and provincial governments.343
 The candidates’ positions regarding national unity rose in importance as the leadership 
campaigned progressed. MacEachen and Martin both flagged national unity as the most pressing 
issue facing federal politicians.344 Similarly, Sharp floated the idea of eliminating the monarchy 
in an attempt to stabilize national unity.345 Turner was far less subtle in his comments on the 
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issue, criticizing his own government by suggesting that Trudeau’s approach to Quebec was too 
tough.346 Similarly, Maurice Sauvé, a prominent supporter of Martin, challenged Trudeau’s 
position as excessively theoretical and piped that Quebec required a solution of practical 
politics.347 Trudeau was hailed as the solution to national unity in Le Devoir, however, indicating 
that there was no consensus on the issue in Quebec. 
 On the opening day of the Convention the Toronto Daily Star reported that Turner, 
Winters, Hellyer, Martin and Kierans all preached a flexible approach to Quebec that preserved 
Canadian unity. These views challenged both Trudeau’s and the government’s position. Turner 
took a direct shot at Trudeau: “I believe you will never solve the problem of Canada by logic, by 
the mind or by the intellect alone--that you’ll solve it by the heart and you’ll solve it by the gut 
because that’s what Canada is all about.”348 Moreover, Turner chastized Trudeau for his hardline 
approach, suggesting that “the solution lies in negotiation and not in confrontation.”349 Winters 
called for a new constitution based on “the growing recognition of the “French fact” in Canada 
and the ‘indistinct jurisdictions’ between the two main levels of government.”350 In dealing with 
Quebec, Winters and Hellyer advocated appeasement.351 Martin called for greater co-operation 
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with provincial premiers, while Kierans envisioned a new constitution with a more decentralized 
federal government.352
  Trudeau challenged his leadership opponents and Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson at the 
convention. While Trudeau’s opponents disputed his position on federal-provincial relations, 
specifically on Quebec, the Justice Minister continued to direct his arguments toward the Quebec 
premier who had been elected on a slogan of “equality or independence.” The Toronto Daily Star 
reported:
Trudeau launched immediately into an attack on Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson’s view 
that what Quebec needs is not so much protection for individual rights but for collective 
rights.
“When we talk of our country I like to think of the individuals in the country,” he said. 
“When we talk of constitutional matters, when we talk of federal-provincial relations, I 
like to think of the individual.”
“I believe that it is the individual human being which is the backbone of a country. This is 
something we got away from when we began to deal with these various problems of 
national unity.”
“The citizens of Canada are not too concerned whether the exercise of this jurisdiction 
comes from the federal government or the provincial governments.”353
In his speech to Liberal delegates on 5 April 1968 Trudeau called into question his colleagues’ 
positions on national unity. Specifically Trudeau described their positions as evasive:
I believe that  the voters or the members of a party, either Federal or Provincial, have the 
right  to demand that their leaders speak out  clearly on the role of Quebec another vital 
issues. We are no longer satisfied with vague generalities or adroit  evasions. Those who 
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Trudeau’s comments demonstrated a consistent position on issues concerning Quebec and 
federal-provincial relations. His comments also drew a line in the sand for his opponents, 
whether Liberal or Conservative, federalist or separatist. 
 Trudeau’s opponents also threatened to exacerbate the issue of national unity to gain 
partisan favour. How would they continue to serve under a Trudeau government if they feel his 
approach to Quebec and constitutional issues were so wrong? By calling out his Liberal 
opponents for not taking a concise position on national unity, and by suggesting his opponents 
also lacked confidence in democracy, Trudeau also created an “us versus them” paradigm within 
the party which undermined the possibility of post-convention unity. How could Trudeau justify 
trusting these Liberals in the constitutional debates of the future? The debates surrounding 
national unity at the 1968 convention ran deep and revealed a clear divide among Liberals, with 
direct consequences on the future leadership of both the party and the country.
The Balloting
 The balloting to select the next leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Prime Minister 
took place on Saturday 6 April 1968. Some candidates dropped off the balloting refused to 
publicly endorse anyone, while others moved openly to their former opponents’ boxes on the 
convention floor. The entire process was a political spectacle unfolding live on national 
television. Some Liberal candidates took defeat hard, and the winners of each ballot watched as 
opponents, sometimes friends, dropped out of the race and even endorsed another candidate. The 
consequences of the balloting left lasting scars on the Party. In terms of pure politics, 
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organization and unity, the 1968 convention saw most leadership candidates prioritize their own 
careers over the success of the political organization.  
Voting was conducted under the supervision of two returning officers appointed by the 
convention. The returning officers appointed deputy returning officers and clerks to supervise the 
voting at each individual polling station. The Convention Committee decided that delegates 
would vote on IBM Votomatic computer voting machines. The results were tabulated by 
computer and reported by the returning officers. Delegates were divided into voting stations 
based on alphabetical order and were required to wear their delegate’s badge to vote.355
 A candidate with more than 50 per cent of the vote would be declared the winner of the 
Liberal leadership race, but the rules for balloting had changed since 1958. The new rules of 
procedure explained that “the candidate receiving the lowest number of votes or all candidates 
receive less than 50 votes in any ballot shall be dropped from the list of eligible candidates.” In 
the event of a tie between the two lowest candidates with both vote totals in excess of 50, both 
candidates could remain on the ballot.356
 Voting for the first ballot began around 1:00 p.m. on the final day of the convention. Each 
candidate had their own box on the convention floor where they, their friends and family, and 
prominent supporters sat between votes. The first ballot results confirmed that Trudeau was the 
favourite, leading after the first ballot. Martin’s 277 votes were considered a significant 
disappointment, confirming media speculation about his slipping support.357 Martin wrote in his 
memoirs that he and his campaign team realized the likely result of the first ballot after the 
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opening day of the Convention,358 which his son corroborates.359 The Minister of External 
Affairs told his advisors that he planned to withdraw after a poor showing on the first ballot.360 
When he did, he refused to publicly support another candidate -- despite attempts by both 
Hellyer and Winters to bring him on their sides.361 Not even his own son knew for whom his 
father voted.362 Kierans also withdrew and, like Martin, refused to endorse another candidate. 
Henderson was forced off the ballot and MacEachen, who intended to withdraw, was unable to 
do so in time and stayed on the second ballot. Despite the technical error, MacEachen moved to 
Trudeau’s box and supported him for leader.363 
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Table 1: Ballot Results at the 1968 Liberal Leadership Convention
First Ballot Second Ballot Third Ballot Fourth Ballot
Joe Greene 169 104 29 -
Paul Hellyer 330 465 377 -
Lloyd Henderson 0 - - -
Eric Kierans 103 - - -
Allan MacEachen 165 11 - -
Paul Martin 277 - - -
Pierre Trudeau 752 964 1,051 1,203
John Turner 277 347 279 195
Robert Winters 293 473 621 954
Spoiled Ballots 24 15 19 13
Total Vote 2,390 2,379 2,376 2,365
MG 28 IV 3, Liberal Party fonds, volume 1158, file - National Leadership Convention 1968 - Balloting Results, 
“Balloting Results,” Library and Archives Canada.
Hellyer went into the Convention believing he could win. Although second to Trudeau, 
Hellyer’s first ballot showing was a significant disappointment to his campaign, which believed 
he would achieve at least 439 votes.364 In an interview with Peter Stursberg, Hellyer openly 
admitted that his speech had cost him. “What went wrong?” Hellyer asks rhetorically. “Mostly 
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my speech. It lost me, I think, about 140 first-ballot votes. We had someone polling people on the 
way in, and on the way out, and the difference was just dramatic. The difference was heightened 
by Joe Greene’s great stump speech just ahead of me.”365 Hellyer attested that many who left him 
on the first ballot intended to come back to him -- but some never did.366 Whelan writes in his 
memoirs that Winters was involved in a three-way race with Trudeau and Hellyer, but Martin 
remembers being surprised of Winters’ showing on the first and subsequent ballots.367 Sullivan 
writes that Hellyer’s campaign immediately reached out to Winters’ but failed to persuade him to 
drop out and endorse Hellyer.368
 The second ballot of the Convention changed the outlook of the race. With MacEachen 
opting to support Trudeau, this left a total of 569 votes up for grabs. Trudeau continued to grow 
his first ballot lead, winning 26 per cent of the free delegates, to Hellyer’s 24 and Turner’s 12. 
Winters was the surprise, however, growing his vote by 31 per cent from the first ballot. Hellyer 
and Winters were within 8 votes of one another and both refused to move to the other. Turner’s 
showing grew but his total was far from matching Hellyer and Winters. According to Sullivan, 
Winters was a major threat to Trudeau.369 Litt contends that after the second ballot, Hellyer and 
Winters needed to align with a third candidate to defeat with Trudeau,370 but neither Hellyer nor 
Winters were ready to step aside and allow the other to challenge Trudeau. Bill Lee, Hellyer’s 
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Campaign Manager, advised Hellyer to move to Winters. “It’s over, Paul... Let’s go now.”371 
Hellyer refused.
 The Hellyer-Winters log jam exemplified the Liberal Party’s intra-organizational 
weakness coming out of the 1968 Convention. Neither candidate would join together to stop 
Trudeau, even though he represented a fundamentally different Liberal than what they both 
preferred. Realistically, Hellyer and Winters’ opportunity to join their campaigns had to happen 
before the third ballot to draw significant support away from Turner and Greene. Hellyer refused 
to go to Winters because he believed his centrist delegates would not follow in large numbers.372 
Therefore Hellyer attempted to persuade Winters to move to him. Winters, in second place, 
refused to support a candidate with fewer votes than himself. Litt writes that Bill Lee, Hellyer’s 
campaign manager, also attempted to persuade Hellyer to drop out and switch to Turner, 
believing that Turner represented the best opportunity to grow support,373 but Hellyer also 
refused to support a candidate with fewer delegate votes than himself.374
 The Liberal infighting became public. “In the midst of the emotional uproar after the 
second ballot at the Liberal leadership convention Saturday,” Cahill reported in the Toronto Daily 
Star, “Secretary of State Judy LaMarsh struggled through the screaming crowds clutching a 
green and white Robert Winters button in her hand”375: 
She was weeping as she leaned over Transport Minister Paul Hellyer and shouted in his 
ear.
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“Go now, Paul,” she yelled at  the man she had backed int  he leadership race. “If you don’t 
go now you’re only making a Trudeau.
“If you don’t back Winers it will be too late and Trudeau will make it.”
“Winters is all right. You know him and he knows you. You’re all right with him.”
And if you don’t  get together,” she shouted, “you’ll both go down and let that  bastard 
in.”376
LaMarsh disputes the facts. “The public has the erroneous impression that I called the Prime 
Minister a bastard in public, on television,” she said in her memoirs. “I did not do that.”377 
LaMarsh did call Trudeau a bastard, but behind his back -- although she spotted the reporter 
within earshot when she shouted in Hellyer’s ear. “I knew that remark was likely to come to the 
public’s attention,” she conceded. “I could not know that a directional microphone had also 
picked it up for the world to hear.”378 LaMarsh had told her riding association before the 
convention that she did not intend to seek re-election, but her reference to Trudeau signaled the 
intensity and bitter feelings associated with the leadership race. Regardless, Hellyer refused to 
budge and LaMarsh retreated to Winters’s box in tears. 
 The third ballot of the convention saw only 26 free votes as MacEachen was finally off 
the ballot. Greene’s support took a significant hit, with the Minister of Agriculture losing 75 
votes, finishing under 50 votes, and being automatically removed from the fourth ballot. Greene 
moved to Trudeau’s box, also endorsing the Justice Minister. Both Turner and Hellyer lost votes 
as well. Winters claimed the majority of switched votes on the third ballot, capturing 148 votes 
or 57.5 per cent. Trudeau still captured 33.8 per cent of the switched vote (87 total ballots), 
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however, upping his overall numbers to 44.2 per cent of the total vote. This pushed him closer to 
the 50 per cent plus one margin of victory.
 When Hellyer decided to concede and drop out of the race to endorse Winters, both tried 
to bring Turner on board in a last ditch attempt to defeat Trudeau. Turner turned them both away, 
making good on his pledge to make no deals and let the convention decide. Radwanski suggests 
that if Turner had moved to Winters, Trudeau may have lost on the final ballot: 
Although he arrived at  the convention as the clear leader and maintained his position with 
strong performances in the policy workshops and in his main speech to delegates, 
Trudeau’s victory was by no means certain until the fourth and final ballot; even after the 
third ballot...he might still have been defeated if Turner had thrown his support  behind 
Winters instead of staying in the race to the finish.379
Cahill and Litt refute Radwanksi’s logic. They assert that Turner’s campaign manager Jerry 
Grafstein believed that Turner’s delegates, for the most part Young Liberals, would not support 
Winters.380 Furthermore Litt asserts that Turner did not like the optics of Anglophones ganging 
up on Trudeau, the lone French-Canadian in the race.381 Turner refused and stayed on for what 
would be the fourth and final ballot.
 Perhaps Bill Lee had it right on the second ballot when he asked Hellyer to move to 
Turner. Maybe Turner could have defeated Trudeau by uniting anti-Trudeau centrist and right-
wing Liberals. Whatever “what if” history might have brought, Trudeau won on the fourth ballot 
with 50.8 per cent of the vote. Winters and Turner ascended to the stage and made the choice 
unanimous. The enigmatic Trudeau was the new Liberal leader and the next prime minister.
Conclusion
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The wheel of time had turned for the Liberal Party and the 1968 Convention 
demonstrates a transformation in Party culture. In the wake of multiple decades of electoral 
success, the Party was ripe for a new direction. The introduction of amendments to the criminal 
code, the adoption of universal health care, a distinct Canadian flag and the Canada Pension Plan 
all resembled a Canada looking to grow and modernize. Many new Liberals sought to build on 
the Party’s long history and build bridges into Canada’s next generation. The 1968 Convention 
saw more than just new candidates, but a debate on the various directions the Liberal Party and 
the country, could go.
Alternance was a prevalent issue among Liberals at the 1968 Convention. Although the 
media ignored alternance as a method of defining the narrative, it remained a quiet factor as 
Liberal delegates made up their minds. The evidence suggests that alternance inspired strong 
feelings at the parliamentary levels of the party, which still exerted influence on party members. 
Although it was not the only factor or even the most important one, it clearly helped frame the 
perception of how some Liberals viewed the leadership question. 
Alternance was compounded with a field of adept potential Liberal leaders vying for the 
job. The strong field of candidates and the likelihood of multiple ballots heightened uncertainty 
surrounding the 1968 convention. Although Trudeau had significant momentum at the outset, 
predictions that Hellyer, Winters and Turner were picking up steam proved accurate. In the end 
Trudeau won on the fourth ballot after Hellyer, Winters and Turner were unable to unite their 
cause. The intensity of the convention and the months of campaigning that preceded it made 
personal agreements between the candidates difficult to accept on the early ballots. 
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 The tactics deployed at the 1968 convention speak to the intensity of the race and the 
desire to win. Rumours of dirty tricks persisted and spilled out into the press. Liberal candidates 
were at odds with one another and the Canadian media reveled in details of infighting. The 
candidates knew that their best chance to win the leadership was to lure their opponents into 
supporting them after an early exit, but the intensity of the race complicated the trust needed to 
secure such support before and during the balloting. 
 The large number of strong candidates in the race perpetuated rumours of back room 
deals. The chapter linked together the reports in the Canadian media with private political 
accounts. The inability or unwillingness of other candidates’ to come together meant that no one 
could stop Trudeau’s surging campaign. The back room deals that occurred at the 1968 
Convention equated to personal interest, success and ambition, relegating any benefits to the 
Liberal Party to the periphery of the negotiations.
 A startling component of the 1968 convention is the disputes over national unity that 
occurred openly amongst Liberal Party leadership candidates. Without question all the major 
candidates were playing politics with national unity as it related to Quebec. Many of the 
leadership candidates sought to gain political traction in the race by publicizing discontent within 
the government. Trudeau drew a line in the sand between his opponents and himself on his home 
province. The Justice Minister stood by his policy and questioned the integrity of his colleagues. 
Although his indirect remarks about his colleagues are justified in defence of government policy, 
it raised questions around the membership and unity of Cabinet after the convention. Moreover, 
the outcome of the convention would have a bearing on federal-provincial relations. Trudeau’s 
opponents questioned his own position on national unity as well as federal-provincial relations, 
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thus openly criticizing the policy of the government in which they served and hoped to lead. 
Diverging positions on national unity generated credibility issues that should have been 
discussed behind closed doors like the rest of government business. 
 The 1968 convention can also be explained through theoretical constructs. Courtney 
asserts that as the number of candidates seeking the office increases, so does the number of 
ballots it takes to elect a winner. The nine candidates seeking the leadership resulted in four 
ballots before Trudeau was crowned the winner. Hellyer and Winters were ideal partners against 
Trudeau under the conflict of interest theory, as both were considered right-leaning Liberals and 
Trudeau left-leaning. Turner was also considered a right-leaning Liberal and his interests aligned 
well with Hellyer and Winters. Nevertheless, the three candidates were unable to come together 
in time to stop Trudeau.
 Courtney’s theory that that candidate who gains the largest share of the votes from the 
first to the second ballot ultimately wins the leadership race did not hold true in 1968. Winters 
gained 31 per cent of the free delegates on the second ballot compared to Trudeau’s 26. 
Ultimately Trudeau went on to win. Still, Courtney’s alternative hypothesis that the leader after 
the first ballot ultimately goes on to win the convention holds true.  Trudeau led on the first 
ballot, capturing 31 per cent of the total vote, and won the leadership.
 The tension of the 1968 Liberal leadership race culminated in the balloting, where 
candidates plotted against others. In the end, Hellyer, Winters and Turner proved unwilling to 
come together to promote their vision of the Liberal Party which differed so greatly from 
Trudeau’s. Trudeau stood pat and outwaited his opponents. A clear differentiation between 
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groups remained: the Hellyer and Winters camp remained divided from both the Turner camp, 




 Late in his life, Mackenzie King shared his recipe for political success with Lester 
Pearson: it matters not what you do right but what you avoid doing wrong.382 Martin Goldfarb 
and Tom Axworthy explain that “King’s formula for never doing wrong rested on brokerage: if 
one could include all major interests within the party, then conflicts could be managed internally, 
allowing the party to present a unified front to the public.”383 
! As time progressed, the races for Liberal Party control grew more sophisticated and 
complex, forcing the Ottawa-based power clusters to listen to and court the opinions of Liberals 
across the country. The growth and evolution of the leadership convention in Canadian politics is 
explicitly clear through an examination of the 1948, 1958, and 1968 Liberal Conventions. John 
Courtney argues that leadership conventions can be summed up into two eras: the first is from 
1919 to 1958 and is distinguished by the dominance of the parliamentary caucus of the party; 
while the second era is from 1967 to 1990 and is characterized by the intense competitiveness of 
the contests.384  In 1948 and 1958, both St Laurent and Pearson were heavy favourites. The 1968 
Convention was far more difficult to predict. With a large number of competitive candidates and 
anticipation of multiple ballots, media coverage in 1968 allowed each of the candidates to expose 
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the weaknesses of their opponents in a public setting. With the leadership perceived to be in the 
grasp of several candidates, the bitterer the battle became.
 The tactics utilized at Liberal leadership conventions also changed over time. Strategies 
to court delegates emerged, as did campaign plans designed to weaken their opponents’ efforts. 
Part of this evolution involved backroom deals. In 1948 William Lyon Mackenzie King quietly 
engineered the endorsement of St Laurent by key senior Liberal cabinet ministers at the 
convention. In 1968, the media exposed backroom dealing in detail, allowing the candidates to 
posturing to bring more delegates onside. The focus of the race changed from the strength of the 
Liberal Party to the success of individual leadership candidates.
 The examination of the 1948, 1958 and 1968 conventions has demonstrated the evolution 
of alternance and its impact on Liberal leadership races. In 1948 alternance was largely 
associated with King’s efforts in supporting St Laurent. King believed it right to entrust a Liberal 
from Quebec with the responsibility of party leader. In 1958, although unstated, St Laurent 
seemed to prefer Pearson as his successor. St Laurent warned Paul Martin Sr. in 1948 that the 
Liberal Party would likely be unable to elect two consecutive French-speaking Roman Catholics. 
Consequently, Pearson’s election as leader ensured that alternance would be a factor in Liberal 
leadership races from that point onward. By the time of the 1968 Convention, alternance had 
become part of party discourse and was a well-known factor for both elected and grassroots level 
Liberals.
 Internal unity proved increasingly tenuous over time. In 1948 King’s efforts at the 
convention preserved party unity. In 1958 the race between Martin and Pearson was 
characterized by their ability to push personal ambition aside and continue to work together for 
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the good of the party organization. Unity took a sudden turn at the 1968 convention. The race to 
replace Pearson was associated with the question of what the Party would become under the 
leadership of each of the candidates. Accordingly, the race focused entirely on the individuals 
and deviated from the strength and maturity of the organization as a whole. The race took an 
even sharper turn when the candidates opposed one another on issues concerning national unity. 
These factors saw Trudeau stand his ground on government policy towards Federal-Provincial 
relations, especially in regard to Quebec, while his opponents opposed him and Pearson’s 
approach to the issue. This debate over national unity was a fundamental flaw in the 1968 
leadership race and spawned disunity within the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party’s most senior 
officials were on record opposing Trudeau’s approach to Federal-Provincial relations. 
 Paul Martin Sr. was a fundamental player in the three conventions from 1948-1968. 
Martin’s desire to be Liberal leader and prime minister was evident as early as 1948, but his 
career was marred by the unfortunate circumstances associated with timing and identity politics. 
In 1948 Martin refused to test the waters and run against St Laurent. He was clearly perturbed by 
King’s interference in the race but ultimately opted to support St Laurent, whom he believed to 
be the best choice for Liberal leader. In 1958 Martin’s race against Pearson failed as a result of 
poor timing, unsupportive press coverage and a lack of support within caucus. His cultural, 
linguistic, and religious background would have been a drag on a party that needed to entice 
voters in English-speaking, Protestant ridings of Ontario and the Maritimes. Pearson was a better 
fit, strategically, to win an election. Moreover, the media’s portrayal of the race between a 
premier Canadian statesman and front-runner versus a professional politician and underdog 
ultimately undermined Martin’s dreams. Martin seemed the logical choice to succeed Pearson in 
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1968 until Trudeau entered the race. Martin’s identity as a French-speaking Roman Catholic 
from Ontario did not stand up to a comparatively young, energetic, French-speaking candidate 
from Quebec. Martin bowed out after the first ballot and refused to break neutrality. It is hard not 
to sympathize with the man who put his party before his own ambitions for more than two 
decades. Martin served three Liberal leaders in the House of Commons, the Senate and the 
international stage -- a committed partisan through and through.
 But times had changed, and so had the party.  The 1968 Liberal Convention marked a 
change in party politics that had long nurtured working relationships amongst ideological 
liberals, conservatives and moderates under the banner of the “governing party.” Near-
unanimous leadership choices at the 1948 and 1958 Conventions were relegated to the Liberal 
past. By 1968, Liberal leadership hopefuls placed their personal ambitions over the solidarity and 
success of the party. 
! The priorities for Liberals like King, Gardiner, St Laurent, Howe, Pearson, and Martin 
were different than those of Trudeau, Hellyer and Winters. For the former, the Liberal Party was 
a lifetime investment, a vehicle to bring progress and betterment to Canadians. They viewed the 
Liberal Party as a team, a brand that was trusted. The latter saw things differently. Members with 
ambition now viewed the political organization as a vehicle for personal achievement, prestige 
and betterment. Turner, who reveled in Liberal traditions, eventually felt dissociated as well. Still 
is it not accurate to say that this new generation of Liberals was purely selfish and self-
motivated. Their attitudes represented a change in party culture. As an institution, the Liberal 
Party became polarized. Hellyer soon left the party altogether. John Turner resigned in 1975 after 
Trudeau overruled his finance minister’s refusal to impose mandatory wage and price controls. 
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Turner, who reveled in Liberal traditions, felt dissociated. According to Litt, Turner felt his 
personal position would deteriorate while the government slid “dreamily left.” With party 
leadership out of reach, Turner walked away for a decade, feeling that Trudeau separated him 
from the beliefs and morals that drew him to be a Liberal in the first place.385 He only returned 
after Trudeau announced his retirement. These aspirants to leadership desired to be more than 
mere parts of the Liberal machine. They desired leadership, subscribed to their own views, and 
refused to be a part of the new leader’s team. This trend of infighting for control in the Liberal 
Party would continue for decades. 
 The Liberal Wars began during Trudeau’s administrations and continue today. The 1984 
leadership campaign was a race between Jean Chrétien, who championed Trudeau’s record as 
Liberal leader, and Turner, who sought to distance himself from the party establishment. After 
Chrétien lost the leadership to Turner, tension built between the two until 1986. Press stories 
documented Chrétien’s desire to be leader, while Turner sought to consolidate his control over 
the party by limiting Chrétien’s performance in the House of Commons. Chrétien hit the boiling 
point when Turner interfered in the race for Liberal Party president in 1986 by convincing 
Francis Fox (favoured by Chrétien) to quit the race in favour of Paul Routhier.386 Consequently, 
Chrétien informed Turner on 27 February 1986 that he was resigning his seat after twenty-three 
years in politics.387 
When the Liberal Party held a leadership race to replace Turner in June 1990, Chrétien 
returned and the delegates elected him leader on the first ballot over his main opponent Paul 
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Martin Jr. Chrétien went on to lead three majority governments before stepping down amid 
rampant speculation of a Martin leadership bid in 2003. “I did not like what was happening 
within the party,” Chrétien confesses in his memoirs, “especially as I knew it was all for 
nothing.” 388 Martin Jr. elaborates on the intense environment in his own memoirs. “It was by 
this time indisputable that the party and the caucus did not want to face another election under 
the same leadership,” he observes. “The same was true of the public.”389 Martin was the odds on 
favourite to replace Chrétien, but their mutual dislike was palpable and increasingly obvious both 
within and outside of the party. 
 Martin won the Liberal Party leadership at the 2003 Convention and won a minority 
government in the 2004 general election. Ultimately Martin Jr.’s government was brought down 
by the Quebec sponsorship scandal – a legacy of the Chrétien era.   Unable to recover politically, 
the Liberals lost the 2006 election to Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party. Martin Jr. resigned in 
the wake of this bitter defeat, but party infighting continued, driven by the belief that the Liberals 
were always just one election away from returning to office. The pattern persisted under 
Stéphane Dion, Michael Ignatieff, and Bob Rae. In shambles, the Liberal party fell to third party 
status in the 2011 federal election – its worst defeat in history. As the party finds itself searching 
for a new leader today, the question remains whether the candidates will be able to balance their 
personal ambitions with the good of the party – and the good of the country.
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